Briggs: Historians, inconsistent and contradictory, stop short of real analysis.
Translation:
II.
How does power move peoples?
Private historians of biography and historians of individual peoples understand this force as power, inherent in heroes and lords. By their writings, events are produced exclusively by the will of Napoleons, Alexanders or all those persons that are described by the private historian. The answer, given to this family of historians to the question about that strength which moves events, is satisfactory, but only while exists one historian for each event. Yet as soon as historians of institutions and nationalities begin to view and to describe one and the same event, those answers, given by them, immediately again lose all meaning, for this power is understood by every one of them not only differently, but often completely oppositely. One historian approves that the event was produced by the power of Napoleon; another approves that it was produced by the power of Aleksandr; a third, — the power of some third face. Besides this, the historians of this family contradict one another even in the explanations of those forces, in which were found one power and the same face. Thier, a Bonapartist, speaks that the power of Napoleon was found in his virtues and genius; Lanfrey, a republican, speaks that it was found in his fraud and in the deceit of the people. So it is that historians of this family, mutually destroying the situation of each other, by that very thing destroy the concept about strength producing events, and do not give an answer to the substantial question of history.
General historians, having business with all peoples, as if recognize the injustice of the view of private historians in force producing events. They do not recognize these forces for the power inherent in heroes and lords, but consider it the result of the diverse direction of many forces. Describing war or conquered people, the common historian seeks out the cause of events not in the authorities of one face, but in the interaction of each other with the many persons related with the event.
By this view the power of historical persons presenting the work of many forces, it would seem, it may now not be considered power by itself producing the events. Between that general historians, in most cases, use the concept about authorities again as force, the very thing by itself producing events and related to it, as a cause. By their outlining that historical face is the composition of its time, and its power is only the composition of the institutions of forces; that power is the power producing events. Gervinus and Schlosser, for example, and others that prove that Napoleon is the composition revolution, the ideas of the year 1789 and etc., all speak that the trip of the 12th year and other not liked by them events have a crux only in the works of the falsely directed commitment of Napoleon and that the very ideas of the year 1789 were stopped in its development owing to the arbitrariness of Napoleon. The ideas of revolution and common mood made the power of Napoleon. The power of the same Napoleon suppressed the ideas of revolution and the common mood.
This strange contradiction is not accidental. It not only meets in each step, but from the consistent number of these contradictions is drawn up all the descriptions of common historians. This contradiction is going on from that, marching in the soil of analysis, general historians stop at half roads.
So that the component of forces gives a famous integral or resultant, it is necessarily so that the amount of the component equals the integral. This is a condition never to be observed by general historians, and because of it, so to explain the resultant force, they necessarily must admit, besides their insufficient component, a still unexplained force, acting on the integral.
The private historian, if describing the trip of the 13th year, or the recovering of the Bourbons, all speak that these events were produced by the will of Aleksandr. Yet the common historian of Gervinus, refuting this view of private history, strives to show that the trip of the 13th year and the recovering of the Bourbons, besides the commitment of Aleksandr, had reasons in the activity of Stein, Meternich, m-me Staël, Talleyrand, Fichte, Chateaubriand and others. The historian obviously spreads out the power of Aleksandr to a composite: Talleyrand, Chateaubriand, and etc.; the amount of this composite, i.e. the action of Chateaubriand, Talleyrand, m-me Staël and others, obviously does not equal throughout the resultant, i.e. to that phenomenon that millions of French submitted to the Bourbons. And because of it, so to explain, how the way of this composite leaked out conquered millions, i.e. the composite, equal to one but, flowed out by the resultant, equal to a thousand, but the historian necessarily should allow again that same force of authorities, which he denies, recognizing the result of forces, i.e. he should allow an unexplained force, acting on the integral. This very thing is done by general historians. And owing to this, they do not only contradict private history, but themselves.
The village residents, not having a clear idea about the reasons of rain, speak, looking by that, if they want rain in buckets: the wind disperses the clouds and the wind catches up the clouds. So exactly general historians: sometimes, when they want this, when this is the approach to their theory, they speak that power is the result of events; but sometimes when they need to prove another, — they speak that power produces events.
The third historians, called historians of culture, following by the way paved by general historians, recognize sometimes writers and give forces, producing events, still completely otherwise understand this force. They see it in so-called culture, in mental activities.
Historians of culture are completely consistent by relation to their ancestors, — common history, for if historical events can explain by that, how some people are such and such related to each other, then why are they not to be explained by that how such and such people wrote such and such books? These historians of only a huge number of signs, accompanying all living phenomenon, choose the sign of mental activities and speak that this sign is the cause. Yet, despite all of them trying hard to show that the cause of events lie in mental activities, only with large compliance can it be to agree with that between mentally activities and the movement of peoples is something common, but now in which case it cannot be allowed for mental activity to have led the actions of people, for such phenomena as the cruel killings of the French revolution, flowing out of sermons about the equality of humanity, and the worst wars and executions, flowing out from sermons about love, contradict this assumption.
Yet allowing even that correct is all the intricate reasoning which is filled with this history; allowing that peoples are managed by some uncertain force, called an idea, — the substantial question of history all the same stays without answer, to previous authorities of monarchs and to the introduced by general historians influence of advisers and other persons joins still the new power of ideas, which recognized with masses requires explanations. It is possible to understand that Napoleon had power, and because of it subjected an event; with some compliance it can still be to understand that Napoleon, together with other influences, was the cause of events; but in what way the book The Social Contract1029 made the French to begin to drown each other, — may not be understood without the explanations of the casual communication of these new forces with the event.
Undoubtedly exists the recognized between all at the same time living, and because of it there is the opportunity to find some recognition between the mental activity of people and their historical movement, exactly so the same as this recognition can be found between the movement of humanity and trades, crafts, gardening and what is wanted. Yet why the mental activity of people presents to the historians of culture the cause or expression of only historical movements, — this is difficult to understand. Such the conclusion of historians can explain only next: 1) the story is the spell of scientists, and because to them it is natural and nice to think that the activity of their estates is the only foundation of movements of humanity, exactly so the same as this is natural and nice to think for merchants, farmers, soldiers (this is not spoken out only because of how merchants and soldiers do not write history), and 2) spiritual activity, education, civilization, culture, ideas, — all this idea is obscure, undefined, under the banner which quite conveniently uses the words, having still less clear meanings and because of it is easily substitutable under all sorts of theory.
Yet not speaking about the inner dignity of these family of stories (it may be, they for someone or for something is needed), the history of culture, which begins more and more to come down to all general history, is significant by that, they, in detail and seriously sorting various religious, philosophical, political teachings, as the causes of events, any time, as they only have to describe a valid historical event, as for example the trip of the 12th year, describe it unwittingly as the composition of authorities, all saying that this trip is a composition of the commitment of Napoleon. Said in such a way, historians of culture unwittingly contradict themselves, proving that that new power, which they think does not express historical events, but that the only means to understand the story is that power which they as if would not recognize.
1029 Contrat Social (Social contract)
Mentioned: 1789, 1812, 1813
Locations:
Mentioned: French
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: Tolstoy recognizes the subjectivity of how historians understand the force that drives history depending on what culture they come from. More unbiased historians, whom Tolstoy calls "general historians", are seen by him as having a contradiction that stops halfway on the path of analysis and he develops this by showing how their math doesn't add up. He does this by showing that how the power of rulers can not be broken up into components (that is, ministers or thinkers) unless it explains how millions submit to that power and that attempting to explain whether people's power comes from events or produces them is a hopeless circle. He also shows how understanding intellectual movements does not help develop the explanation for events, just as the idea of equality of man should not have lead to the murders of the revolution. He believes this thinking exists precisely because historians are themselves scholars and like to believe that intellectual activity provides events.
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Napoleon
Alexander
Thiers
Lanfrey (as in Dole, Edmonds, and Bell. "Lanvrey" in Wiener.)
Gervinus
Schlosser
Stein
Metternich
Madame de Stael
Talleyrand
Fichte
Chateaubriand
(also different kinds of biographers and historians. The Bourbons are mentioned in relation to being restored. Briggs attaches Rousseau's name to The Social Contract.)
Abridged Versions: No break in Bell.
Gibian: Line break instead of chapter break.
Additional Notes: Mandelker: "Dr C. G. Gervinus (1805-71) was a German historian and Shakespearean commentor with whom Tolstoy disagreed on both counts."
Garnett: "Pierre Lanfrey (1828-1877) wrote the Histoire de Napoleon Ier (History of Napoleon I), which appeared in print just as Tolstoy was completing his novel."
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