Briggs: Freedom and necessity are interdependent. Neither is absolute.
Translation:
X.
So, our presentation about freedom and need gradually decreases and increases, looking by the greater or lesser communication with the outside world, by the more or less distancing of time and the more or less addictions of reasons, in which we examine the phenomenon of the life of a man.
So that, if we examine such the position of a human, in which he is recognized with the outside world mostly known, the period of time of judgments from the time of committing the act of the greatest causes of the act the most accessible, then we receive the presentation about the greatest need and the smallest freedom. If again we examine a human in the smallest addictions from external conditions; if his action is committed at the nearest moment to the present, and the causes of his action to us is unavailable, then we receive a presentation about the smallest need and the greatest freedom.
Yet in this, or in another case, as we would change our point of view, as would understanding ourselves that recognition, in which is a person with the outside world, or as it would seem available to us, as would a lengthened or shortened period of time, as would be understandable or incomprehensible for us causes, we never can to ourselves represent complete freedom, or complete need.
1) As we would present to ourselves a human excluded from the influence of the outside world, we would never receive an idea about freedom in space. All the actions of a human is inevitably conditioned to the very body of the human, and by that what surrounds him. I lift my hand and lower it. My action seems to me free; but asking myself: could I by all directions raise my hand, I see that I raised my hand by that direction, by which for this action were less obstacles, being as in bodies surrounding me, so and in a device prepared for bodies. If of all possible directions I chose another, then I chose it because of how by this direction were less obstacles. So that my action was free, it is necessary, so that it did not meet any obstacles to itself. So that to represent ourselves as a free human, we must represent ourselves as beyond space, what is obviously impossible.
2) As we would move closer to the time of judgments to the time of an act, we never receive the idea of freedom in time. For if I examine an act, absolutely a second to that backwards, I all the same should acknowledge the unfree act, as the act is chained by that moment of time in which it was committed. Can I raise my hand? I lift it; yet I ask myself: could I not raise my hand in that already past moment of time? So that to make sure in this, I in the next moment do not lift my hand. Yet I did not raise my hand in that first moment, when I asked myself about freedom. The time passed, to hold which was not in my authorities, and that hand which I then raised, and that air, in which I then did that move, now is not that air, which now surrounds me, and not that hand, which I now do not make movements. That moment, in which was subjected the first move, is irrevocable, and in that moment I could do only one move, and what would I do with the move, this move could be only one. That, what I in the next moment not raising my hand, does not prove that I could not raise it. And so as my move could be only one, in one moment of time, then it could not be another. So that to represent it to myself as free, I need to represent it to myself in the present, in the facets of the past and future, i.e. beyond time, what is impossible.
3) As would increase the difficult comprehension of causes, we never come to the presentation of complete freedom, i.e. to the lack of causes. As would be incomprehensible for us the cause of expressions the commitment in which would be ours or a stranger’s act, the first demand of the mind is the assumption and finding of causes, without which no phenomenon would be unthinkable. I lift my hand with that, so that to commit an act independent from every cause, but that I want to commit an act, not having causes, is a cause preparing the act.
Yet even if we would, presenting to ourselves a human completely excluded from all influence, looking at only his momentarily current act and assuming that it was caused by no reason, we have allowed an infinitely little remainder needing to equal zero, we would then not come to the notion about complete human freedom; for a being, not hosting in itself influence outside the world, located beyond time and not dependent from reasons, now is not a person.
Exactly so the same we never can represent to ourselves the action of a human, which would happen without the participation of freedom and subject to only the law of need.
1) As would increase our knowledge those space of conditions, in which is a person, this knowledge never may be complete, so as the number of these conditions is infinitely great so the same as is infinitely space. And because as soon as are not identified all conditions, not all influences on a human, then there is no complete need, but is a famous share of freedom.
2) As we would lengthen the period of time from this phenomena which we examine, to the time of judgments, this period will be finite, but time is infinite, and because of this there may never be complete need.
3) As would be available a chain of reasons which would be or was an act, we never will know throughout the rows, so as it is infinite, and again never receive complete need.
Yet, besides this, if we would even, allowing the remainder of the smallest of freedom to equal zero, we would recognize in some cases, as, for example, in a dying man, in an embryo, in an idiot, completely absent of freedom, we would by that very much destroy the very concept about the man which we examine; for as only there is no freedom, there is no human. And because of the presentation about the action of a human, subject only to the law of need, without the slightest remainder of freedom, so the same it is impossible, as the presentation about the quite free action of a human.
So, so that to represent to ourselves the action of a human, subject only to the law of need, without freedom, we must allow the knowledge of an endless quantity called conditions, an infinitely great period of time and an endless number of reasons.
So that to represent to ourselves a human completely free, not subject to the law of need, we must represent him to ourselves as alone beyond space, beyond time and beyond addictions from reasons.
In the first case, if would be possible misery without freedom, we would come to the definition of the law of need to that same necessity, i.e. to one form without content.
In the second case, if would be possible freedom without need, we would come to the certainty of freedom beyond space, time and reasons, which because of most of what would be certain and not limited to, would be nothing or one content without forms.
We would come to all that by two foundations, from which forms all the outlook of a human — to the incomprehensible entities of life and to laws, defining this essence.
The mind speaks: 1) space with all forms that give it its visibility — matter — is infinite and may not be thought otherwise. 2) time is the endless move without one moment of peace, and it may not be thought otherwise. 3) recognized reasons and the consequences have no beginning and may not have an end.
Consciousness speaks: 1) I am alone, and all that exists, is I alone; therefore, I include space; 2) I measure the running of time in a motionless moment of the current, in which I alone am aware of myself living; therefore, I am beyond time, and 3) I am beyond causes, for I feel myself the cause of any manifestations of my life.
The mind expresses the laws of need. Consciousness expresses the essence of freedom.
Freedom, not restricted, is the essence of life in the consciousness of a human. Misery without content is the mind of a human with its three forms.
Freedom is that, what is considered. Misery is that, what we examine. Freedom is content. Misery is form.
Only in the severing of the two known sources, related to each other as form to content, received separately, mutually excluded and incomprehensible to the idea about freedom and about need.
Only in their connection it turns out to be a clear presentation about the life of a human.
Beyond these two mutually defined in the connection of it, — as form with content, — concepts, impossible is no presentation of life.
All that we know about the life of people, is only the famous attitude of freedom to need, i.e. consciousness to the laws of intelligence.
All that we know about the external world of nature is only the famous attitude of the forces of nature to need, or the entities of life to the laws of intelligence.
The forces of the life of nature lie beyond us and are not realized by us, and we call these forces attraction, inertia, electricity, animal force and etc.; but the power of the life of a human is realized by us, and we call it freedom.
Yet exactly so the same, as is incomprehensible itself the power of attraction, felt by every human, only in so much as it is understandable to us, in how much we know the laws of need, which it is subject to (from the first knowledge that all bodies are heavy, to the laws of Newton), exactly so the same and incomprehensible, itself, is the power of freedom, realized by everyone, only in so much as is understandable to us, in how much we know the laws of need, which it is subject to (beginning from how any person dies and to the knowledge of the most complex economic or historical laws).
All knowledge only sums up the entities of life under the laws of intelligence.
The freedom of a human is distinguished from every other force by that how this power is realized by a human; but for intelligence it is not distinguished from every other force. The power of attraction, electricity or chemical is akin only by that and distinguished from each other, that this force is differently identified in the mind. Exactly so the same the power of the freedom of a human for intelligence is distinguished from other forces of nature only by that definition which it gives this mind. Freedom again is without need, i.e. without laws of intelligence defining it, not distinguished from attraction, or warmth, or forces of vegetation; — it is for intelligence only a momentarily, uncertain sensation of life.
And as uncertain is the essence of the forces moving heavenly bodies, as uncertain is the essence of the forces of warmth, electricity, or the forces of chemical affinities or vital forces forming the content of astronomy, physicists, chemistry, botanists, zoology and etc., exactly so the same is the essence of forces of freedom forming the content of history. Yet exactly so the same as the subject of every science is the manifestation of these unknown entities of life, itself the same this essence may be only the subject of metaphysicians, — exactly so the same the manifestation of the forces of the freedom of people in space, time and addictions from reasons forming the subject of history; the same freedom itself is the subject of metaphysicians.
In sciences about alive bodies that what we know, we call laws of need; that, what is unknown to us, we call vital by force. The vital power is only the expression of the unknown remainder from what we know about the entities of life.
Exactly so the same in history, that what we know, we call laws of need; that, what is unknown, — freedom. Freedom for history is only the expression of the unknown remainder of what we know about the laws of the life of a human.
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Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: The impossibility of total necessity or total freedom and its relation to the identity of humanity is explored. The battle of reason versus consciousness as two opposing viewpoints is developed: "Reason expresses the laws of necessity. Consciousness expresses the essence of freedom." Interestingly, this creates a sort of freedom-of-the-gaps issue, as the last sentence of the chapters shows "For history, freedom is only the expression of the unknown remainder of what we know about the laws of human life."
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
(Tolstoy refers to himself in the first person. The laws of Newton are also mentioned.)
Abridged Versions: Line break in Dole after "absolute Freedom of the acts of man."
End of Chapter 4 in Bell.
Gibian: Line break instead of chapter break.
Additional Notes:
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