Briggs: Napoleon's dispositions, and how they failed to materialize.
Maude: Napoleon's dispositions for the battle of Borodino. They were not carried out
Pevear and Volokhonsky: Napoleon's disposition of his troops.
Translation:
XXVII.
All this day on the 25th of August, as speak his historians, Napoleon was spent on a horse, examining the terrain, discussing plans, representing himself to his marshals, and personally gave back orders to his generals.
The initial line location of the Russians troops, by Koloch, was broken and part of this line, the left flank of the Russians, owing to the taking of the Shevardin redoubt on the 24th, was carried off backwards. This part of the line was not strengthened, not defended by more than a river, and before it was one more open and even place. It was obvious for any of the military and non-military that this part of the line must be the attack of the French. It seemed that for this was not needed many considerations, was not needed such solicitude and trouble for the emperor and his marshals, and quite did not need that special higher ability, called genius, which is so loved to attribute to Napoleon; but historians, afterwards describing this event, and people, then surrounding Napoleon, and he himself, thought otherwise.
Napoleon drove by the weeds, thoughtfully peered at the terrain, himself and by himself approving or suspiciously rocking his head and, not informing his surrounding generals of this thoughtful passage, which led his decisions, delivered to them only the final findings in the form of orders. Listening to a proposal of Davout, called the Duke of Ekmuhl, for a walk around the left flank of the Russians, Napoleon said that this was not needed, not explaining why this was not needed to do. To a proposal of the same of General Compana (who was to attack the flushes), to conduct his division to the forest, Napoleon expressed his consent, despite that what the so called Duke of Ekmuhl, i.e. he, allowed himself to notice, how moving by the wood was dangerous and may upset the division.
Examining the terrain against the Shevardin redoubt, Napoleon thought for some time silently, and pointed out to a place at which was to be arranged tomorrow two batteries for action against Russian fortifications, and a place where nearby from them should be a line up of field artillery.
Giving back this and other orders, he returned to his headquarters, and under his dictation was written the disposition of the battle.
This disposition, about which with delight speak French historians, and with deep respect other historians, was the following:
"From dawn two new batteries, arranged at night, on the plain occupied by the Prince of Ekmuhl, open fire by the two opposing batteries of the enemy.
"At this same time the chief artillery of the 1st corps, General Pernetti, with 30 guns of the division of Compana and by all the howitzers of the divisions of Dessaix and Frian, will move forward, opening fire and covering with grenades the enemy of the battery, against whom will act:
24 guns of the guards artillery,
30 cannons of the division of Compana
and
8 cannons of the divisions of Frian and Dessaix.
_________________________________
Only...62 guns.
"The chief artillery of the 3rd corps, General Fouche, placed all howitzers of the 3rd and 8th corps, only 16, by the flanks of the battery, which is appointed to shell the left strengthening, what will be against it in all 40 cannons.
"General Sorbier should be ready, by the first order, to take out all howitzers of the guard artillery against one, or another strengthening.
"In the continuation of the cannonade, Prince Ponyatovsky directs to the village, in the forest, and will bypass the enemy position.
"General Compana moves through the forest, so to control the first strengthening.
"By introducing the way to battle, orders will be given according to the action of the enemy.
"The cannonade on the left flank begins, as only will be heard the cannonade of the right wing. The shooters of the division of Moran and the division of the vice-king open in strong fire, seeing the start of the attacks of the right wing.
"The vice-king will take possession of Borodino692 and get over by his three bridges, following to one height with the divisions of Moran and Gerard, which, under his leading, directs to the redoubt and enters at the line with the other troops of the army.
"All this must be executed okay [everyone must do well and on method]693, protected by the opportunity of troops in reserve.
"At the imperial camp, near Mozhayck, 6th September, of the year 1812."
This disposition, quite not clear and confused in writing, — if we allow ourselves without religious horror to the genius of Napoleon to relate his orders, — concluded in itself four paragraphs — four orders. Not one of these orders could be or were executed.
In the disposition it is said, first, so to arrange to the chosen Napoleon location for the battery having to align with those guns of Pernetti and Fouche, only 102 guns, to open fire and bombard the Russian flushes and redoubts with shells. This could not be done, as, with the appointed by Napoleon places, the shells did not reach to the Russians’ work, and these 102 guns fired would be empty to those since, while the nearest chief, nasty to the order of Napoleon, would not have put them forward.
The second disposition consisted in so that Ponyatovsky, heading for the village in the forest, went around the left wing of the Russians. This could not be and was not done, because of how Ponyatovsky, heading for the village in the forest, met there the obscuring to him the road Tuchkov, and could not walk around and did not go around the Russian positions.
The third disposition: General Compana moves in the forest, so to control the first strengthening. The division Compana did not control the first strengthening, but was repulsed, because of how, exiting from the forest, it was to build under a carton of fire, what Napoleon did not know.
The fourth: the vice-king controls the village (Borodino) and gets over by his three bridges, following to one height from the divisions of Moran and Frian (about which it was not said: where and when they will move), which under it leading direct to the redoubt and entering in the line with the other troops.
How much one can understand, — if not of this stupid period, that of those attempts, which were made by the vice-king to perform the data of his orders, — he should move across Borodino left to the redoubt, the same divisions of Moran and Frian were to move at the same time with the front.
All this was so the same as other points of the disposition, was not and could not be executed. Having passed Borodino, the vice-king was repulsed at Koloch and could not take farther; the same divisions of Moran and Frian did not take the redoubt, but were repulsed, and the redoubt now at the end of the battle was occupied by cavalry (probably, it was unforeseen business for Napoleon and unheard of). So not one of the orders of the dispositions were and could be executed. Yet in the disposition it said that by the introduction of such a way in the battle, will be given orders for the respective action of the enemy, and because it would seem that in the time of battle Napoleon will make all necessary orders: but this was not, and could not be, because of how in all the time of the battle Napoleon was found so long away from it, that (as this manifested afterwards) the moving of the battle could not be famous to him, and not one disposition of his in the time of the battle could be executed.
692 village
693 (le tout se fera avec ordre et méthode), ((all will be done with order and method),)
Mentioned: 24th, few minutes, daybreak
Locations: near Mozhaysk
Mentioned: Kolocha, Russians, Shervadino Redoubt, French, Eckmuhl, Elchingen, Borodino (also village)
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: We keep following Napoleon, with the qualifier "as his historians say" in a chapter full of explanations of troop movement and positioning. It is extremely easy to see that the French should attack the weak left flank, but Napoleon makes a production of making his genius seem like it is important to reflect on this decision.
Tolstoy takes Napoleon's disposition from Bogdanovich's History of the Fatherland War of 1812. Tolstoy also adds a footnote to this long disposition about the village "That is, Borodino".
Then Tolstoy says "This disposition, drawn up quite vaguely and confusedly--if one allows oneself to consider Napoleon's instructions without religious awe of his genius--contained four points, four instructions. Not one of these instructions was or could be carried out."
Tolstoy then goes through the points and shows why they couldn't or didn't happen. He also critiques the "muddled sentence(s)" of the order, a call back to Rostopchin's (with a bewildered Pierre discussing with him) critique of the wording of dispositions.
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Napoleon (also "emperor")
Davoust (also called "the Duke (or Prince) of Eckmuhl".)
General Campan (as in Dole, Maude, and Edmonds. "...Compans" in Briggs and Garnett.)
Ney (also "Duke of Elchingen". Briggs adds Marshal prefix.)
General Pernety ("...Pernetti" in Wiener, Edmonds, and Bell.)
Dessaix (as in Dole, Dunnigan, and Mandelker. "Desaix" in Garnett and Briggs.)
Friant
General Fouche
General Sorbier
Prince Poniatowski
General Morand
Gerard (assumedly not the painter since he is a general.)
Tutchkof
Murat (just "the viceroy". The Garnett footnote says it is Murat, the King of Naples, as does the Mandelker (and Maude) endnote, also calling him the "vice-king".)
(also Napoleon's "historians", the men who think he is a genius, his soldiers, generals, etc. Tolstoy also mentions "the nearest commander ordered them forward, contrary to Napoleon's decree.")
Abridged Versions: No break in Bell.
Gibian: Chapter 27.
Fuller: Entire chapter is cut.
Komroff: Only the opening paragraph is preserved.
Kropotkin: Entire chapter is cut.
Bromfield: It doesn't appear there is a matching chapter.
Simmons: Chapter 27: entire chapter is cut and replaced with: "Tolstoy summarizes Napoleon's dispositions for the battle of Borodino and points out why they could not be, and were not, executed."
Additional Notes:
Roberts: Page 214: “Joseph Fouche was no ordinary police chief. An Oratorian intending to join the Church until he was twenty-three, he became a regicide Jacobin in 1793. More interested in power than ideology, he kept up many contacts among the royalists, and he protected priests, especially Oratorians, despite being a leader of the anti-clerical party. ‘Everyone knows this personage’, wrote Napoleon’s future aide-de-camp Comte Philippe (Page 215) Segur, ‘his medium stature, his tow-coloured hair, lank and scanty, his active leanness, his long, mobile face with the physiognomy of an excited ferret; one remembers his piercing keen gaze, shifty nevertheless, his little bloodshot eyes, his brief and jerky manner of speech which was in harmony with his restless, uneasy attitude.”
Page 606: “He couldn’t commit the Guard with the Russian General Platov threatening his left flank and rear; and if he had sent them down the Old Post Road on the southern flank of the battlefield at noon, when Poniatowski had not captured one side of the road, it might have been severely damaged by the Russian artillery.”
Segur/Townsend: Page 64: "It was Napoleon who had ordered the left wing to attack violently, perhaps thinking that he would be only half obeyed, or merely wanting to draw the enemy's attention to that side. He now issued order after order, at the highest pitch of excitement. His attack would have to be from the front, instead of in an oblique line, as he had planned."
Davidov/Trubetzskoy: Page 167: "This is a reminder that luck may intervene in all plans and events, and that whereas decisive actions that destroy an army and change the course of a campaign may be the fruits of experience and genius, they have to be accompanied by such whims of chance."
No comments:
Post a Comment