Book 3 Part 2 Chapter 1 (Chapter 188 overall)

Chapter Summaries: Dole: Philosophy of Napoleon's invasion. Theory of necessity. Criticism. Ex-post-facto prediction. Facts opposed to hypotheses. Statement of facts. History as seen from the perspective of darkness. Union of the armies. Bagration's letter to Arakcheyef.
Maude: Reflections on the campaign of 1812. The course of events was fortuitous and unforeseen by either side
Briggs: The events of 1812, despite the 'planning', were unforeseen and fortuitous.
Pevear and Volokhonsky: Thoughts on the events of 1812 and on human freedom.

Translation:

Part the Second.

I.

Napoleon started war with Russia because of how he could not not come into Dresden, could not not be fogged up by honors, could not not put on a Polish uniform, not succumb to the enterprising impression of a June morning, could not abstain from outbreaks of anger in the presence of Kurakin and then Balashev.

Aleksandr refused from all negotiations because of how he personally felt himself offended. Barclay-de-Tolly tried the best way to manage the army, so that to perform his duty and deserve glory as a great commander. Rostov galloped in attack to the French because of how he could not hold on from his willingness, skipping by the even ground. And so exactly, owing to their personal properties, habits, conditions and goals, acted all those uncountable faces participating in this war. They were afraid, conceited, rejoicing, indignant, reasoning, believing that they knew what they did, and what they did for themselves, but all were involuntary weapons of history and produced a hidden from them, but understandable for us job. Such is the unchanging fate of all practical actors, and by that were not freer than the higher standing in human hierarchies.

Now that the figures of the year 1812 have for a long time gone off from their places, their personal interests have disappeared without a trace, and only the historical results of this time is before us.

Providence forced all these people, striving to achieve their personal goals, to promote the execution of one huge result, about which one person (Napoleon, Aleksandr, or still less some of the participants of the war) did not have the slightest aspirations.

Now to us it is clear that the year of 1812  was the cause of the destruction of the French army. No one will begin to argue that the cause of the destruction of the French troops of Napoleon was with one part introduced to them in the later time without preparation to the winter hike in deep Russia, but with one part a different character, which accepts war from burning Russian cities and the excitement of hatred to the enemy in the Russian people. Yet then not only did no one foresee this (what now seems obvious), that only by this path could die 800-thousand, best in the world and led by the best commander, an army in collision with the twice weaker, inexperienced and led by inexperienced generals, Russian army; not only no one foresaw this, but all efforts with the parties of the Russians were constantly aspiring in that, so that to hinder what alone could save Russia, and with the parties of the French, despite the experience and so called military genius of Napoleon, were directed all efforts to that so that to stretch out to the end of the summer to Moscow, i.e. to do that very thing that must ruin them.

In the historical essays about the year 1812 French authors extremely love to speak about how Napoleon felt danger in stretching his lines, how he sought battle, how his marshals advised him to stay in Smolensk, and bring other similar arguments, proving that then now as if was understood the danger of the campaign; but Russian authors still more love to speak about how from the beginning of the campaign existed a plan of Scythian war luring Napoleon into deep Russia and credited this plan some to Pful, some to Frenchman, some to Toll, some to the very Emperor Aleksandr, pointing at notes, at projects and letters, at which we really find hints in this form of action. Yet all these hints at this foresight that happened, as with the parties of the French, so with the parties of the Russians, exhibit now only because of how the event justified them. Should the event not have been subjected, then these hints would have been forgotten, as are forgotten now a thousand and million opposite hints and assumptions, arriving and going then, but caught up to be untrue and because of it forgotten. About the ending of each of the ongoing events there always were so many assumptions of how it would be finished, always are found people that say: "I then still said that this would be so," forgetting really that in the number of countless assumptions were made the completely opposite.

The assumptions about the consciousness of Napoleon of the dangers of stretching the lines and, with the parties of the Russians, about the luring of the enemy into deep Russia — belong obviously to these categories, and historians only from a large stretch may attribute such considerations to Napoleon and his marshals and such plans to Russian military leaders. All facts completely contradict such assumptions. Not only in all the time of war, with the parties of the Russians was there not a willingness to lure the French into deep Russia, but all was done so to stop them from the first entry of them into Russia, and not only was Napoleon not afraid of stretching his lines, but he rejoiced, as in celebration, at each of his steps forward, and very lazily, not so as in his former campaigns, sought battle.

In the very beginning of the campaign, our army was cut off, and the only objective, to which we strived, consisted so that to unite them, although for this, to go back and to lure the enemy in the deep country, in the connection of the armies did not present benefits. The emperor was located in the army for the inspiration of it in defending each step of the Russian earth, but not for retreats. Was arranged a huge Drissa camp by the plan of Pful, and it was not supposed to go back onwards. The sovereign makes reproaches to the commander in chief behind every step of retreat. Not only the burning of Moscow, but the assumption of the enemy to Smolensk did not even present to the imagination of the emperor, and when the army united, the sovereign was indignant for how Smolensk was taken and burned, and was not given before the walls of it a general battle.

So thought the sovereign, but Russian warlords and all Russian people were still more indignant at the thought about how we retreated into the deep country.

Napoleon, cutting the army, moves into the deep country and misses a few cases for battle. In the month of August he is in Smolensk and thinks only about how he would go farther, although as we now see, this move forward for him was obviously disastrous.

The facts speak obviously that Napoleon did not foresee the dangers in the movement to Moscow, or Aleksandr and Russian warlords did not think then about luring Napoleon, but think otherwise. Luring Napoleon into the deep country happened not by someone’s plan (no one believed in the opportunity of this), but happened from the most difficult game of intrigue, goals, and desires of people — the participants of war, not guessing what must be, and that was the only salvation of Russia. All was going on accidentally. The army was cut off in the beginning of the campaign. We try to unite them with the obvious purpose to give battle and to hold the offensive of the enemy, but in this striving for connection, avoiding battles with the stronger enemy, and unwittingly walking away, under a sharp angle, we start up the French to Smolensk. Yet little say that we walk away under a sharp angle, because of how the French move between both armies — this corner is done still sharper, and we still farther go away, because of how Barclay-de-Tolly, an unpopular German, the hateful Bagration (having become under his superiors), and Bagration, commanding the 2nd army, tries as he can to longer not join to Barclay, so that to not become under his command. Bagration for long does not join (although in connection was the main objective of all chief persons), because of how for him it seems that he in this march puts in danger his army, and that it is more profitable only for him to retreat to the left and to the south, bother with the flank and the rear of the enemy and completing his army in Ukraine. But it seems this was invented because of how he did not want to obey the hated and junior in rank, German Barclay.

The Emperor was located in the army so that to inspire it, but his presence and ignorance in what to decide, and the huge number of councilors and plans destroy the energy of the action of the 1st army, and the army retreats. In the Drissa camp they were supposed to stay; but suddenly Pauluchi, aiming at commander in chief, his energy acting on Aleksandr, and all the plans of Pful are flung, and all the business is charged to Barclay. Yet as Barclay did not inspire trust, his power was limited.

The army is fragmented, has no unity in superiors, Barclay is not popular; but from this confusion, the fragmentation and unpopularity of the German commander in chief with one party follows hesitation and avoidance of battle (from which it could not hold on, should the army have been together and Barclay was not the chief), with different parties — all more and more indignation against the Germans and excitement of patriotic spirit.

Finally the sovereign goes away from the army, and as the only and most comfortable pretext for his departure elected the idea that he was needed to inspire the people in the capital for the excitement of folk war. And this trip of the sovereign to Moscow triples the forces of the Russian troops.

The sovereign went away from the army so that to not constrain the unity of the authority of the commander in chief, and hope that will be accepted more decisive steps; but the position of the superiors of the armies were still more confused and weakened. Bennigsen, the great prince and hero of the general adjutants stayed in the army so that to observe behind the actions of the commander in chief and excite him to energy, and Barclay, still less feeling himself free from under the eyes of all those eyes of the sovereign, was made more careful for decisive action and avoided battle.

Barclay stood for care. The tsesarevich hints at treason and requires a general battle. Lyubomirsky, Branitsky, Vlotsky and those similar inflate all this noise, that Barclay, under the pretext of delivering papers to the sovereign, sends out Pole general adjutants to Petersburg and enter into open battle with Bennigsen and the great prince.

At Smolensk finally, how not desired by Bagration, united the army.

Bagration in a carriage drove to the home occupied by Barclay. Barclay puts on a scarf, exits towards and reports to the senior ranked Bagration. Bagration, in a struggle of generosity, despite the seniority of rank, obeys Barclay; but obeys, still less agreeing with him. Bagration personally, by order of the sovereign, informs him. He writes to Arakcheev: "The will of the sovereign prepares, I in no way together with ministers (Barclay) can be. For God, send me somewhere to command a regiment, but here I cannot be; and all of the main apartment is filled with Germans, so that to live in Russia is impossible, and there is no sense. I thought, truly I serve the sovereign and the homeland, but in verification of exit that I serve Barclay. I confess, I do not want to." Swarm Branitsky, Wintsengerode and to that similar still more poisons the intercourse of the commander in chief, and exits still less unity. They are collected to attack the French before Smolensk. Was sent a general for a review of the positions. This general, hating Barclay, rides to a friend, a corps commander, and, sitting at him for a day, returns to Barclay and condemns by all points the future field of battle, which he has not seen.

While happen disputes and intrigue about the future field of battle, while we were looking for the French, mistaken in their found location, the French stumble onto the division of Neverovsky and approach to the very walls of Smolensk.

It was needed to accept the unexpected battle in Smolensk, so that to save their posts. Battle is given. The killed are thousands with that and with different parties.

Smolensk is left contrary to the will of the sovereign and only the people. Yet Smolensk is burned by the inhabitants themselves, deceived by its governor, and the ravaged residents, showing an example to other Russians, ride to Moscow, thinking only about their losses and inciting hatred to the enemy. Napoleon is going farther, we retreat, and reach that very thing that must have been to conquer Napoleon.

Time: June morning, the year of 1812, August

Locations:
Mentioned: Russia (and Russian), Dresden, Polish, French, Europe, Moscow, Smolensk, Scythian, Drissa, German, Ukraine, St. Petersburg

Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: Start of Part Two. “Napoleon started the war with Russia because he could not help going to Dresden, could not help getting befuddled with honors, could not help putting on a Polish uniform…” Again, determinism causes us to reflect on the responsibility these characters have for their actions.

Barclay de Tolly wanted to do his duty and get the glory of being a great general. Rostov’s actions in the last part were because he could not help it.

“The higher they stand in the human hierarchy, the less free they are.”

The only way the horrors and senselessness of the war makes sense is for us to admit that these people had (Pevear and Volokhonsky use the italics) to do what they did because of “Providence”.

“No one will dispute that the cause of the destruction of Napoleon’s French forces was, on the one hand, their advance late in the year, without preparations for a winter march, into the depths of Russia, and on the other
hand, the character that the war took on with the burning of Russian towns...not only did no one foresee this, but all efforts on the part of the Russians were constantly aimed at hindering the one thing that could save
Russia…”

Tolstoy critiques the way historians and authors point to selected details that would otherwise be forgotten to show that what happened was planned out: “people will always be found who say, “I said back then that it
would be like this,” quite forgetting that among the numberless suppositions, there were some that were completely contrary.”

“Not only was there no wish on the Russian side..to lure the French into the depths of Russia, but everything was done to stop them from the moment of their entry into Russia….Napoleon..was very lazy, not as in his
previous campaigns, in seeking a battle.”

We then switch to the “our” perspective, and present tense to show that the Russians did not want to retreat.

“The facts say the obvious thing, that Napoleon did not foresee the danger of moving on Moscow, nor did Alexander and the Russian commanders think then about luring Napoleon...It all occurs by chance”.

Again Barclay de Tolly is “an unpopular German”. The Bagration and de Tolly rivalry, in which their armies avoid each other, is reminiscent of the early campaign as mentioned in Bilibin’s letter.

“Paulucci, who aims at becoming commander in chief, unexpectedly affects Alexander with his energy, and Pfuel’s whole plan is dropped”.

“Barclay, feeling himself still less free under the eyes of all these eyes of the sovereign, becomes still more wary of decisive actions and avoids battle.”

So, as Tolstoy sets up in Part 1, the division of leadership leads to the avoidance of battle, not, as some claim, a set plan by the Russians. It is an accident, “chance”, that things turned out the way they did.

The Russians then do not know where the French are, make a mistake, and the French “stumble” upon Smolensk. “It is necessary to accept the unexpected battle at Smolensk in order to save our lines of
communication….Smolensk is abandoned against the will of the sovereign and all the people.” Interestingly, the “will”, so important in philosophy in the 1800s, has no real mark on the events as they happen.

Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):

Napoleon

Kurakin

Balashof

Emperor Alexander (also “sovereign”)

Barclay de Tolly (also derisively called “minister”)

Rostof (meaning Nikolai.)

Pfuhl

Toll (for some reason, Bell drops the Pfuhl and Toll references when discussing how they are given credit by Russian authors.)

Bagration

Paulucci

Benigsen

Grand Duke (also “tsesarevitch”.)

Liubomirsky (“Lubomirsky” in Edmonds, Garnett, and Mandelker. “Lyubomirsky” in Briggs.)

Brannitsky (“Bronnitski” in Maude and Dunnigan. “Bronnicki” in Wiener. “Bronnitzsky” in Bell. “Bronnitsky” in Mandelker, Garnett, and Edmonds.)

Vlotzky (“Wlocki” in Maude, Wiener, and Briggs.)

Arakcheyef

Winzengerode (referred to by plural.)

Nevyerovsky (as in Dole and Dunnigan. “Neverovsky” in Bell, Mandelker, and Dunnigan.)

(also of course the French army, the Russian people, French and Russian authors, etc. Also an unnamed general who goes to his friend a corps commander and then criticizes what he hasn’t even seen. Also
Smolensk’s governor.)

Abridged Versions: Start of Part Two in Dunnigan, Mandelker, Briggs, and Edmonds.

Start of Part Second in Dole.

Start of Part the Tenth in Wiener. Start of Part Ten in Garnett. Start of Book Ten in Maude.

Chapter 7 in Bell.
Gibian: Start of Book Ten. 1812 Dates of Principal Historical Events
Old Style New Style
Aug. 4 Aug. 16 Apatych at Smolensk hears distant firing.
Aug. 5 Aug. 17 Bombardment of Smolensk.
Aug. 7 Aug. 19 Prince Nicholas Bolkonski leaves Bald Hills for Bogucharovo.
Aug. 8 Aug. 20 Kutuzov appointed Commander in Chief.
Aug. 10 Aug. 22 Prince Andrew's column abreast of Bald Hills.
Aug. 17 Aug. 29 Kutuzov reaches Tsarevo-Zaymishche and takes command of the army.
Aug. 17 Aug. 29 Nicholas Rostov rides to Bogucharov.
Aug, 24 Sept. 5 Battle of the Shevardino Redoubt.
Aug. 26 Sept. 7 Battle of Borodino
Chapter 1.

Fuller: Entire chapter is cut.

Komroff: Entire chapter is cut.

Kropotkin: Start of Part Tenth 1812: “The invasion of Russia progresses with unexpected rapidity. At places the French are unopposed; where they meet opposition they overcome it with ease. Kutuzof makes a
stand at Borodino; the result is disputed, but the Russian forces fall back on Moscow in September, 1812. The pleasant Russian summer lingers, the weather is comfortable but brisk.”

The chapter begins in the middle and with an early mistake, printing “It is not plain to us what caused the destruction of the French army in the year 1812.” This is the opposite of the meaning, as Dole prints
“now” instead of “not”, though interestingly Bell’s wording makes it as if it is unclear. This disagrees with Wiener and Briggs’s wording, for example.

The section about the French and Russian view of the war, as well some of the discussion of Alexander and Napoleon’s plans are cut, moving to the separation of the army much quicker. Also, a lot of the
division section is removed, keeping all the focus on de Tolly and Bagration.

Bromfield: Start of Part Seven. We start with “What had to happen was bound to happen. Just as Napoleon thought that he started the war with Russia because he wanted a universal monarchy, but really
started it because he could not help coming to Dresden…”

We get an analogy of a horse believing it is free while walking on “the slope of the wheel in a barley-hulling mill...Once you step onto this wheel, there is no freedom…”

The chapter and argumentation is so different that I will use a string of quotes to highlight what I think is most interesting:

“Only Newton, Socrates and Homer act consciously and independently...It is not the argument between materialists and idealists that interests me here...the main argument, which is as simple and indisputable
as Columbus’s egg: I am sitting and writing, beside me lie a gymnastic weight and a dog. Can I or can I not stop writing now?...There are things which one cannot do and things one cannot help doing...The main
source of human error consists in seeking out and defining the causes of the phenomena of human life...I believe Voltaire said that there would not have been any St. Bartholomew’s Night if the King had not
been constipated...The fact of St. Bartholomew’s Night is one of those phenomena of life which occur inevitably according to eternal laws intrinsic to humanity: to kill the excess number of people in one’s
environment and to justify this by adjusting your own passions appropriately...These societies have just as great a need for large-scale murders - wars - as individuals have for murders...On a spring day,
from one yard to another you see the peasants emerge on their carts with exactly the same tools to go sowing. They have not conspired, they have not thought about this, but exactly as one bee is followed
by another...it is essential to understand the general characteristics of man: 1. The law of the mind’s adjustment...2. The law that prevents man...from seeing its spontaneous nature and the need to see his
own personal advantage...3. The law of coincidence...Bismarck is convinced that his complicated, cunning and profound considerations of state gave rise to the latest victorious war. The members of
“Vaterland” think that it came about through patriotism. The English think they outwitted Napoleon, but everything that they all think was invented for them by the imagination with the help of the mind - invented
to satisfy European society’s need for bloodletting...War is a boy’s dream...In order to be a genius, you need: 1.  Provisions - organised theft. 2. Discipline - barbaric despotism, the extreme restriction of freedom.
3. The ability to acquire information - spying, deceit, betrayal. 4. The ability to employ military tricks and deceit. 5. What is war itself? - Murder. 6. What are a soldier’s activities? - Idleness. 7. Military morals are
depravity and drunkenness…”

So the chapter is definitely more political and anarchist than what appears in the latter version.

We then go into the summation of the divided army and the lack of decision or a plan. Chichagov and Tormasov are mentioned, as is Armfeldt (who leaves). Murat is explicitly referenced as the one who attacks
Neverovsky. The discussion of Smolensk has more military details and how the battle played out.
Simmons: Start of 1812 Book Ten: Chapter 1. Entire chapter is cut and replaced with: "Tolstoy theorizes on the course of history. All people involved in war at in accord with their personal characteristics, habits,
circumstances and aims. Though they imagine what they do is done of their own free will, they are really involuntary tools of history.

Additional Notes: Rey/Emanuel Page 222: "the tsar, not wanting to deprive himself of a collaborator whose devotion he rightly appreciated, ended up by appointing him (with his accord) president of the new department of

military affairs at the Council of State, making Barclay de Tolly, until then governor-general of Finland, his new minister of war."

Sevastopol in May 1855: Page 33: “Vanity! Vanity! Vanity! Everywhere, even on the brink of the grave and among men ready to die for a noble cause. Vanity! It seems to be the characteristic feature and special malady of our time…

How is it that in our time there are only three kinds of people: those who, considering vanity an inevitably existing fact and therefore justifiable, freely submit to it; those who regard it as a sad but

unavoidable condition; and those who act unconsciously and slavishly under its influence?”

Herold: Page 392: “It was an accident that made up Alexander’s mind for him…”You see,” he said to one of his advisors, “it is Providence that wills it; it manifests and declares itself. No more doubt, no more hesitation.”...whether France was to be governed by the heirs of the French Revolution was determined by the premature order of an obscure general and by Alexander’s tendency to see the hand of Providence in chance events...the emperor’s abdication must include the abdication of the rights of his entire family.”