Briggs: Borodino-a senseless struggle wrongly interpreted by historians.
Maude: Senselessness of the battle of Borodino, and erroneousness of the historical accounts of it. Where and how it was fought
Pevear and Volokhonsky: Thoughts on the battles of Shevardino and Borodino. Errors of the historians. Corrected map of the battlefield.
XIX.
On the 24th was the battle at the Shevardin redoubt, on the 25th was not started up one shot from that, or from different parties, and on the 26th the battle of Borodino happened.
For what and how were the battles at Shevardin and at Borodino given and accepted? For what was the Borodino battle given? For the French, or for the Russians it had not the slightest sense. The nearest result was and must have been — for the Russians that we moved closer to the destruction of Moscow (what we were afraid of more than all in the world), but for the French that they moved closer to destruction throughout the army (what they also were afraid more than all in the world). This result was then already completely obvious, but between that Napoleon gave, and Kutuzov accepted this battle.
If the generals would have been guided by reasonable reasons, it seemed, how clearly it must have been for Napoleon that, to call for behind two thousand versts and taking a battle with a probable chance of losing 1/4th of the army, he was walking into a true death; and so the same it clearly would must have appeared to Kutuzov, that taking battle and also risking the loss of a quarter of the army, for sure losing Moscow. For Kutuzov this was mathematically clear, as it is clear that, if in checkers I have one less checker and I exchange, I will for sure lose, and because of it, should not be exchanging.
When the adversary has 16 checkers, but I have 14, then I am only one eighth weaker than him; but when I exchange 13 checkers, then he will be three times stronger than me.
Before the Borodino battle our forces related to the French about as five to six, but after the battle as one to two, that is before the battle 100 thousand to 120, but after the battle 50 to 100. But together with that the smart and experienced Kutuzov accepted battle. Napoleon the same, an ingenious commander, as he is called, gave battle, losing a quarter of his army and still more stretched his line. If it is said that, by occupying Moscow, he thought, as occupying Vienna, finishes the campaign, then against this is much evidence. The historians of Napoleon themselves tell that still from Smolensk he wanted to stay, knew the danger of his stretched situation and knew that the occupation of Moscow would not end the campaign, because of how from Smolensk he saw in what position were left his Russian cities, and he was not getting one answer to his repeated statements about the willingness to lead talks.
Giving and taking the Borodino battle, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and pointlessly. But historians under committed facts now and then let down slyly woven evidence of foresight and the genius of generals, which of all the involuntary cannons of world events were the most slavish and involuntary actors.
The ancients left us samples of heroic poems, in which heroes form all the interest of history, and we still all cannot get used to that for our time of humanity such a family of stories has no sense.
To a different question: how were Borodino and the prior to it Shevardin battle given? exist exactly also quite certain and to all famous, completely false presentations. All historians describe the business in the following way:
The Russian army, as if it would in its retreat from Smolensk, looked for itself the best position for a general battle, and such a position was found, as if it would be at Borodino.
The Russians, as if it would, strengthened forward this position, to the left from the roads (from Moscow to Smolensk), under an almost direct angle to it, from Borodino to Utitsy, in this very location, where the battle happened.
Ahead of this position, as if it would, was exposed for the security behind the enemy a fortified cutting edge post on the Shevardin mound. On the 24th, as if he would, Napoleon attacked the cutting edge post and took it; on the 26th again attacked all the Russian army, standing in positions on the Borodino field.
So it says in the stories, and all this is completely unfair, in what is easily convinced any who will want to delve into the essence of affairs.
The Russians were not looking for the best positions; but the opposite in the retreat it had passed many positions that were better than Borodino. They did not stop in one of these positions: and because of how Kutuzov did not want to accept a position elected not by him, and because of how popular demand for battle was still not strongly enough expressed, and because of how had still not come up Miloradovich with the militia, and still by other reasons, which were incalculable. The fact that, — the former positions were stronger, and that the Borodino position (that, in which was given battle) not only was not strong, but was quite not more than any position, than all other places in the Russian empire, on which, guessing, would be indicated by a pin on a map.
The Russians not only did not strengthen the positions of the Borodino field to the left under the direct angle from the roads (that is, this place, in which the battle happened), but and never until the 25th of August of the year 1812 thought about this, so that a battle could happen at this location. This serves as proof firstly that, not only on the 25th was not in this location fortifications, but that they started on the 25th, they were not over on the 26th; the second proof serves the position of the Shevardin redoubt: the Shevardin redoubt, ahead of those positions, in which were accepted the battle, had no sense. For what was stronger than all other points strengthened this redoubt? And for what, defending it on the 24th to the late night, were exhausted all efforts and lost six thousand people? For the security behind the enemy enough was the Cossack departure. Thirdly, the proof that the position in which the battle happened was not foreseen, and that the Shevardin redoubt was not the forward point of these positions, serves that Barclay-de-Tolly and Bagration, before the 25th, were found in the conviction, that the Shevardin redoubt was the left flank of the positions, and that Kutuzov himself in his dispatch, written in the heat of the moment after the battle, called the Shevardin redoubt the left flank of positions. Now much after, when writing in open space reports about the Borodino battle, was (probably as excuses for the mistakes of the commander in chief, having to be infallible) made up that unjust and strange indication, as if the Shevardin redoubt served the forward post (then as this was the only fortified point of the left flank), and as if the Borodino battle was accepted by us in fortified and forward elected positions, then as it happened in a completely unexpected and almost unfortified location.
The business again obviously was so: the position was elected by the river Koloch, crossing the big road not under direct, but under the sharp angle, so that the left flank was at Shevardin, right about the new villages and the center at Borodino, at the confluence of the rivers Koloch and Voyna. This position, under the cover of the river Koloch, for the army, having the purpose to stop the enemy, moving by the Smolensk road to Moscow, is obvious for any, who will look at the Borodino field, forgetting about how the battle happened.
Napoleon, leaving on the 24th to Valuev, did not see (as it says in stories) the positions of the Russians from Utitsy to Borodino (he could not see this position because of how it was not), and did not see the advanced post of the Russian army, but stumbled on the pursuit of the Russian rearguard in the left flank of the positions of the Russians, at the Shevardin redoubt, and suddenly for the Russians lead troops across the Koloch. And the Russians, not having time to march in general battle, retreated its left wing from positions, which they set out to take and occupy a new position, which was not foreseen and not strengthened. Going on the left side of the Koloch, to the left from the roads, Napoleon moved all the future battle right to left (to the parties of the Russians), and carried it in the field between Utitsy, Semenovsky and Borodino (in this field, having in itself nothing more profitable for positions, than all of some other field in Russia) and on this field happened all the battle of the 26th. In a rough shape the alleged plan of the battle and what happened in the battle was the following:
If Napoleon would not have left the night of the 24th to Koloch, and would not have told immediately the same night to attack the redoubt, but would have started to attack on another morning, then no one would have doubted that the Shevardin redoubt was the left flank of our positions; and the battle would have happened so, as we awaited it. In such a case, we probably still harder would have defended the Shevardin redoubt, our left flank; would have attacked Napoleon at the center or the right, and the 24th would have happened a general battle in those positions which were strengthened and foreseen. But so as the attack on our left flank occurred the night following behind the retreat of our rearguard, i.e. directly after the battle at Gridneva, and so as the Russian warlords would not like or not have time to start so the same night of the 24th the general battle, that first and main action of the Borodino battle was lost still on the 24th, and obviously led to the loss and what was given on the 26th.
After the loss of the Shevardin redoubt, to the morning of the 25th, we manifested without positions on the left flank and were delivered in a miserable bending back of our left wing and hastily strengthened it, where it was horrible.
But little understanding that on the 26th of August the Russian troops were standing only under the protection of weak, unfinished fortifications, the disadvantage of this situation increased still by that how the Russian warlords, not recognizing the quite accomplished fact (the loss of the positions on the left flank transfers only the future field of the battle right to left) stayed in their extended positions from the new village tol Utitsy, and owing to this must move their troops in the time of the battle, right to left. In such a way all the time of the battle the Russians had against the French army, directed at our left wing, twice weaker forces. (The action of Ponyatovsky against Utitsy and Uvarov on the right flank of the French formed a separate passage from the battle action.)
So the Borodino battle happened really not so, as (trying to hide the mistakes of our military leaders and owing to the belittling of the glory of the Russian troops and the people) describe it. The Borodino battle did not happen at elected and fortified positions with some of the weakest to the parties of the Russians forces, but the Borodino battle owing to the loss of the Shevardin redoubt, was accepted by the Russians in an open almost not fortified terrain with twice weaker forces against the French, i.e. in these conditions, in which not only was it unthinkable to fight for nine hours and to make an indecisive battle, but it was unthinkable to hold in continuation of three hours an army from complete rout and flight.
Time: 24th (September 5th in Bell), 25th (later 25th of August of the year 1812. 6th in Bell.), 26th (7th in Bell.)
Mentioned: the following morning
Locations: redoubt of Shevardino (also...Mound), Borodino, Utitsa, Kolocha (Kolotcha in Bell. Kalotcha in Dole), Novoe Selo (village of Novoe in Mandelker, Maude, and Pevear and Volokhonsky. village of Novoie in Bell. village of Novoye in Dole and Briggs), Voyna (Voina in Mandelker, Dole, and Bell.), Valuevo (Valuyevo in Dunnigan and Dole. Valuev in Dunnigan. Valouiew in Bell.), Semenovskoe (Semyonovskoe in Pevear and Volokhonsky. Semyonovsk in Briggs, Mandelker, and Dunnigan. Semyonovskoye in Garnett.)
Mentioned: French, Russians, Moscow, Vienna, Smolensk
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: See chapter 9 of Bromfield under the chapter 204 post.
We get an extended analogy of trading one man for another in checkers and why Kutuzov had not been accepting battle and then, unreasonably, does accept battle.
"They did not stop at any of those positions, because Kutuzov did not want to accept a position that he had not chosen, and because the people's call for battle had not yet expressed itself strongly enough, and because Miloradovich had not yet arrived with the militia, and for countless other reasons."
The chapter is so location heavy and explanations of points on a map that the Pevear and Volokhonsky edition provides a map in the middle of it that modifies the map Tolstoy actually mentions in the text.
"the battle of Borodino took place not at all as it is described (in an attempt to conceal the mistakes of our commanders and thereby diminishing the gory of the Russian army and people)."
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Abridged Versions: Start of Volume 1 of Borodino, The French at Moscow--Epilogue--1812-1820 in Bell. No chapter break at what is the end of the chapter in other versions.
Gibian: Chapter 19.
Fuller: Only the first paragraph, which tells us about the 24th, the peace of the 25th, and then 26th the battle starting is preserved with no break.
Komroff: Entire chapter is cut.
Kropotkin: Chapter 15: The section about commanders not being goverened by reason and the checkers analogy is removed. A big section of the chapter, the one dealing with historians explanation of Borodino is removed. A lot of the detail about the movement and troops and decisions of the commanders is removed, compressing the entire chapter into four paragraphs. No chapter break.
Bromfield: See post on chapter 204.
Simmons: Chapter 19: Entire chapter is cut and replaced with "Tolstoy maintains that both Napoleon and Kutuzov acted involuntarily and irrationally in accepting battle at Borodino."
Additional Notes:
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