Briggs: We are not free, but consciousness creates in us an illusion of free will.
VIII.
If history would have business with outside phenomena, this simple decree and obvious law would be enough, and we would have finished our reasoning. But the law of history applies to people. Of a particle of matter we may not say, that it quite not feels the needs of attraction and repulsion, and that this is not true; the same person, who is subject to history, all speak: I am free and because of it not subject to laws.
But the presence of the not expressed issue about the freedom of the commitment of humanity is felt in each step of history.
All serious thinking historians unwittingly came to this question. All the contradictions and ambiguities of history, that false way to which is going this science, is established only in this unresolved issue.
If the will of each human was free, i.e. if everyone could do so, as he wanted, then all history is a row of incoherent accidents.
If even one person of a million in a millennial period of time had the opportunity to do freely, i.e. so, as he wanted, then obviously, that one free act of this human, horrid to laws, destroys the opportunity of existence of what kind would be that or were laws for only humanity.
If again there is though one law, managing the actions of people, then it may not be free commitment, for then the will of people should be subject to this law.
In this contradiction concludes the question about the freedom of commitment, from the oldest times occupied the best minds of humanity and from the oldest times by decree to all its huge meaning.
The question consists in that, looking at a human, as at the subject of security with what would be or were points of view, — theological, historical, ethical, philosophical— we find out the common law of need, to which it is subjected so the same, as all existing. Looking again at it from ourselves, as in that what we know, we feel ourselves free.
This consciousness is completely separate and independent from the intelligent spring of self-recognition. Through the mind of a person, it observes itself; but he knows himself only through consciousness.
Without consciousness ourselves are unthinkable and there is no observation and application of intelligence.
So that to understand, watch and infer, a person should before be aware of themselves living. A living person knows themselves not otherwise as wanting, i.e. realizing their free will. Free will again is a component essential to their life, a person realizes and may not realize otherwise, as being free.
If subjecting themselves to observation, a person sees that his will is directed always by one and that same law (whether he observes it is miserable to take food, or activity of the brain, or what would be or was), he may not understand this is always an equal direction of their commitment otherwise as its limitation. That, what would not be free, could not be and be limited. The will of a human presents to him as limited because of how he realizes it is not otherwise, as free.
You speak: I am not free. But I raised and lowered my hand. Anyone understands that this illogical answer is an irrefutable proof of freedom.
This answer is an expression of consciousness, not the subject of mind.
If the consciousness of freedom was not separate and independent from the intelligent source of self-knowledge, it would be subordinated to reason and experience; but in reality such a subordination never may be and it is unthinkable.
A row of experiences and reasoning shows each person that he as a subject of security is subject to famous laws, and a person obeys them and never fights with the time recognized by them law of attraction or impermeability. Yet that same row of experiences and reasoning shows him that the complete freedom, which he realizes in himself — is impossible, that all of his action depends on his organization, from his character and the acting on him motives; but a person never obeys these conclusions of these experiences and reasonings.
Upon learning from experience and reasoning that a rock falls downwards, a person undoubtedly believes this and in all cases awaits the execution of the recognized by them law.
Yet upon learning so the same undoubtedly that his will is subject to laws, he does not believe it and may not believe this.
How much would the time of experience and reasoning have shown a person that in those same conditions, with that same character he would do that very same, that before, he, in the thousandth time beginning in those same conditions, with that same character to action, always ends equally, undoubtedly feels himself so the same confident in that he may act, as he will want, as before experience. Any person, wildly thinking, as would irresistibly prove his reasoning and experience that, what is impossible to represent to himself two different acts in one and those same conditions, feels that without this senseless presentation (forming the essence of freedom), he may not represent to himself life. He feels that as this would be or was impossible, this is; for without this presentation of freedom he not only would not understand life, but could not live for one moment.
He could not live because of how all the aspirations of people, all the motives to life are cruxed only in the aspirations to the increase of freedom. Wealth — poverty, thanks — suspense, power — subordination, power — weakness, health — disease, formation — ignorance, work — leisure, feeding well— hunger, virtue — vice, the crux of only a larger or smaller extent of freedom.
To represent to yourself a human not having freedom cannot be otherwise, as devoid of life.
If the concept about freedom for the intelligence presents a meaningless contradiction, as the opportunity to commit two different acts in one and those same conditions, or as an action without causes, then this proves only that consciousness is not the subject of the mind.
This is that unshakable, irrefutable, not subject to experience and reason, consciousness of freedom, recognized by all thinkers and felt by all people without exceptions, the consciousness, without which unthinkable is no presentation about man, and forms another side of the issue.
A person is the creation of an omnipotent, all good and omniscient God. What so again is sin, the concept about which follows from the consciousness of the freedom of humanity? Here is a question of theology.
The action of people is subject to common, unchanged laws, expressed by statistics. In what again consists the liability of a human before society, the concept about which follows from a consciousness of freedom? Here is a question of rights.
The actions of a human flow out from his born character and motives, acting on him. What such is conscience and the consciousness of good and evil deeds, flowed out from the consciousness of freedom? Here is a question of ethics.
A person, in communication with the common life of humanity, presents as subordinate to laws, defining this life. Yet that same person, whatever from this communication, presents as free. How should be considered the past life of peoples and of humanity, — how is the composition of free or unfree activities of people? Here is a question of history.
Only in our self-confident time of popularizing knowledge, thanks to the strongest weapon of ignorance — the spread of typography, the question about freedom of commitment is brought together to such the soil, in which may not be itself the issue. In our time the majority of so-called advanced people, i.e. the crowd of the ignorant, accept work as naturalists, engaged in one party of the issue, for the only approval of the issue.
The soul and freedom is not because of how the life of a human is expressed in muscular movements, but muscular movements are conditioned in nervous activity; soul and freedom is not, because of how we in an unknown period of time have occurred from monkeys, — they speak, write and print, quite not suspecting that, a millennium to that backwards, by all religions, by all thinkers it was not only recognized, but never and was not denied that most laws are needed, which with such trying hard they strive to prove now physiology and comparative zoology. They do not see that the role of natural sciences in this question consists only so that to serve as a weapon for the illumination of one of his parties. For that what with points of view of security, mind and will is cruxed only in the branches (sécrétion) of the brain, and that, how a person, following a general law, could develop from lower animals in an unknown period time, understands only with new parties a millennium to that backwards recognized by all religions and philosophical theories, the truth about that from the points of view of an intelligent person subjection to laws is needed, but does not move a hair of the approval of the issue, having another, the opposite side, established in the consciousness of freedom.
If people have occurred from monkeys in an unknown period time, then this is so the same to understand, as that people have occurred from handfuls of earth in a known period of time (in the first case X is time, in the second origin), and the question about in what way to unite the consciousness of the freedom of humanity with the law of need, to which is subjected a person, may not be allowed in comparative physiology and zoology, for in a frog, rabbit and monkey we can watch only muscular-nervous activity, but in a man — muscular-nervous activity, and consciousness.
Naturalists and their worshippers, thinking the consent of this question, are similar to plasterers, which would put against plaster one side of the walls of churches and that, taking advantage of the lack of the main steward work, in an impulse of diligence, would smear his plaster on the window, the images, the forest, and more unapproved walls and would rejoice in that, as with their plaster points of view all exits evenly and smoothly.
Mentioned: a thousand years, thousands of year
Locations: undefined
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: Now we look at the problem of free will. "If the will of each man were free, that is, if each could act as he pleased, the whole of history would be a series of incoherent accidents."
"If there is just one law that governs the actions of men, then there can be no free will, for the will of men would have to submit to that law."
The answer to this contradiction is "the expression of a consciousness not subject to reason." He believes that all of people's actions are "but strivings towards greater freedom."
"Man's acts follow from his innate character and the motives acting upon him."
Tolstoy calls the spread of printing the "most powerful tool of ignorance" and argues against what we would now call "scientism" and maybe just materialism in general by developing the analogy of a plaster who plasters everything of the church to make it all look the same. The chapter also contains arguments that may not be considered anti-evolutionist but somewhat a-evolutionist, as if the evolutionary framework is nothing new.
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
(humanity in general and historians are mentioned. Also naturalists.)
Abridged Versions: End of Chapter 3 in Bell.
Gibian: Line break instead of chapter break.
Additional Notes:
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