Briggs: Actions are partly free, partly the products of necessity.
Translation:
IX.
The approval of the issue about freedom and the need for history, before other industries of knowledge, in which is allowed this question, has that advantage that for history this question applies not to most entities of the commitments of humanity, but to the presentation about the manifestation of this commitment in the past and in famous conditions.
History, by the approval of this issue, becomes to other sciences in the position of science experienced to the speculative sciences.
History in its subject has not the very free will of humanity, but our presentation about it.
And because of it for history does not exist, as for theology, ethics and philosophy, insoluble secrets about the connection of freedom and need. History examines the presentation about the life of humanity, in which the compound of these two contradictions are now subjected.
In the valid life of each historical event, each action of humanity is understood quite clearly and definitely, without feeling the slightest contradiction, despite that each event presents as part free, part necessary.
For the approval of the issue about how to unite freedom and misery, and what forms the essence of these two concepts, the philosophy of history may and should go to the path nasty to that, by which went other sciences. Instead of so that, the defined in themselves ideas about freedom and about need, under the form of definition lets down the phenomena of life, the story of a huge quantity of subjects of its phenomena, always present in addictions from freedom and need, should bring out the definitions themselves of concepts about freedom and about need.
What would we examine the presentation about the activities of many people or one human, we understand it not otherwise, as the work in part of human freedom, in part laws of need.
Whether we talk about the resettlement of peoples and the forays of barbarians, or about the orders of Napoleon III, or about the acts of a human, perfect an hour to that backwards and consisting in that from several directions he walks to choose another, we do not see the slightest contradiction. The measure of freedom and need, leading to the deeds of these people, is clearly defined for us.
Quite often the presentation about the greater or lesser freedom is different, looking by a different point of view from which we examine phenomenon; but, always equally, each action of humanity presents to us not otherwise, as the famous connection of freedom and need. In each consideration of action we see a famous share of freedom and a famous share of need. And always, the more in which would be that or was an action we see of freedom, by that less need; and the more need, by that the less of freedom.
The attitude of freedom to need decreases and increases, looking by that point of view, from which is considered an act; but this attitude always stays back proportional.
A person drowns, who seizes for another and sinks him, or an exhausted feeding child hungry mother, stealing food, or a person, accustomed to discipline, which by command in building kills a defenseless human, presents as less guilty, i.e. less free and more subject to the law of need, to that who knows those conditions, in which are found out this people, and more free to that who does not know that that person themselves are drowned, that the mother was hungry, the soldier was in building and etc. Exactly so the same a person, 20 years to that backwards committed a murder and after this calmly and harmlessly lived in society, presents as less guilty; his act, — more subject to the law of need for this, who examines his act by the expiration of 20 years, and more free to that who considered that same act through the day after, as it was committed. And exactly so the same every act of a human crazy, drunk or strongly excited presents as less free and more necessary to that who knows the mental state who committed the act, and more free and less necessary to that who does not know this. — In all these cases increases or decreases the concept about freedom, and, accordingly to that, decreases or increases the concept about need, looking by that point of view with which is considered the act. So that is the big present misery, by that the smaller present freedom. And vice versa.
Religion, the robust meaning of humanity, the science of right and history itself equally understands this attitude between necessity and freedom.
All without exceptions the cases in which increases and decreases our presentation about freedom and about need, have only three foundations:
1) The attitude of the human committing the act to the external world,
2) To time and
3) To the reasons, producing the act.
The first foundation is more or less visible to us as the attitude of a human to the external world, more or less a clear concept about this definite location, which takes every person by the relation to all, at the same time with it essential. This is that foundation, owing to which obviously that drowned person is less free and more subject to need, than the person, standing on land; that foundation, owing to which the action of a human, living in close communication with other people in a thick-populated terrain, the actions of a human bound by family, service, enterprises, presents as undoubtedly less free and more subject to need, than the action of a human alone and secluded.
If we examine a human alone, without his relationship to all the surrounding, then each of his actions presents to us as free. Yet if we see someone’s attitude to that, what surrounds it, if we see him recognized with what would be or was, with the human who speaks with him, with the book which he is reading, with the labor with which he is busy, even with the air, which he is surrounded by, with even the light which falls on his surrounding items, we see that each of these conditions have on him influence and leads but one part of his activities. And in so many, in which we see much of these influences, in so much decreases our presentation about his freedom and the increase of the presentation about need, which he is subjected to.
2) The second foundation is: a more or less visible temporary attitude of humanity to the world: a more or less clear concept about this location, which the action of a human takes in time. This is that foundation, owing to which fell the first human, having its consequence in the origin of the family of human, presents as obviously less free than in the introduction of marriage in a modern human. This is that foundation, owing to which the life and activity of people, who lived centuries to that backwards, and tied with me in time, may not present me as so free, as the life of a modern person, the consequences of which are still unknown to me.
The gradual presentation about the more or less freedom and need in this regard depends on from the more or less gap of time from the committed act to judgments about it.
If I examine the act, absolutely by me a moment to that backwards, in about those very same conditions, in which I am found out now, my act presents to me as undoubtedly free. Yet if I discuss an act, absolutely a month to that backwards, then, found out in other conditions, I unwittingly recognize that would this act not be committed, — much of the useful, pleasant and even necessary things, flowing out of this act, would not have places. If I fast forward my memory to a deed still more distant, for nine years and onwards, then the consequences of the prepared act presents to me as more obvious; and for me it will be difficult to represent to myself what would be, if there would not be an act. The farther backwards I will transport my memories, or that the very same, forward judgment, by that my reasoning about the freedom act will be kneeled as dubious.
Exactly that same progression of persuasiveness about the participation of free commitment in the common deeds of humanity we find out in history. The accomplished modern event presents to us as undoubtedly the work of all famous people; but in an event more distant we see now its inevitable consequences, the addition of which we can not represent another. And the farther we transport backwards in considering events, by that the less they present to us as arbitrary.
The Austro-Prussian war presents to us as the undoubted consequence of the action of the cunning Bismarck and so on.
The Napoleonic wars, although now doubtful, yet still presents to us as works committed by heroes; but in cross marches we now see an event, definitely occupying their place and without which not thinking a new story of Europe, although exactly so the same for the chroniclers of cross moves this event is presented only as the work of the commitment of some persons. When business is going about the transporting of peoples, to no one now in our time does it come in their head that from the arbitrariness of Attila depended the refresh of the European world. The farther backwards we carry over in history the subject of security, by that dubious becomes the freedom of the people producing the events, and by that is obvious the law of need.
3) The third foundation is the bigger or smaller availability for us endless communication of reasons, which forms the inevitable demand of intelligence, and in which each understands the phenomenon, and because each action of a human, must have their certain place, as following for the previous and as the cause for the subsequent.
This is that foundation, owing to which our actions and other people presents to us, with one party, by that more free and less subject to need, the more are known to us those taken out from the security of physiological, psychological and historical laws, which is subjected to a person, and rather provide us with physiological, psychological or historical causes of actions; with different parties, the easier the very observed actions and the not complicated character and mind of that person, the actions of which we examine.
When we do not completely understand the causes of an act, all care — whether in the case of atrocities, good affairs or even indifferent by good and evil acts, we in such an act know the greatest share of freedom. In the case of atrocities, we only demand more for such an act of punishment; in the case of good affairs, more only appreciate such an act. In an indifferent case we know the greatest individuality, originality, and freedom. Yet if in one of the countless reasons known to us, we know now the famous share of need and less demand retribution for crime, the less we know the merits of a good act, the less from freedom in a seemingly original act. Then, that a criminal was brought up in the environment of villains, now mitigates his blame. The selflessness of a father, mother, the selflessness from the opportunity of awards we more understand, than unreasonable selflessness, and because of it presents as less deserving of empathy and less free. The founder of sects, parties, and inventors less amaze us, when we know how and for what was prepared his activity. If we have a big row of experiences, if our observation is constantly directed in finding the ratios in the actions of people between the reasons and consequences, that action of people presents to us by that more necessary and by that less free, rather than connecting to us consequences with reasons. If considering the actions of the simple, and for us security had a huge number of these actions, our presentation about their need will still be complete. The dishonorable act of a son of a dishonorable father, the evil behavior of woman, caught on a famous Wednesday, returning to drunkenness drunkards and so on crux of actions, which by that less presents to us as free, than the clearer for us their cause. If the very same person, the actions of whom we examine, stands in the lowest extent development of mind, as a child, crazy, fool, then we, knowing the causes of actions and not complicated by character and mind, now see so the big share of need and so small of freedom, that as soon as we know the cause had to produce the action, we can predict the act.
Only in these three foundations are built the essential to all the legislation of insanity crime and reducing blame circumstances. Sanity presents more or less, looking by more or less the knowledge of conditions in which is found out a person, the act of which is discussed, by more or less the interval of time from the commitment of an act to judgments about it and by more or less the understanding of the reasons of act.
Time:
Mentioned: an hour ago, twenty years before, centuries ago, a minute ago
Locations:
Mentioned: Austro-Prussian, Europe (and European)
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: The combination (or compatabilism) of free will and necessity is further explored in a series of theoretical cases, with the point being that an act appears more free and less necessary when seen from the point of view of far away. It is only when we get closer do we see how necessities (or what we might call conditions) drive those actions (and in it, we see Tolstoy give the idea that urban areas people are less free because they are under more conditions and necessities than a rural area). There is also how the concept of time affects our view of its freedom, as actions contemporary to us appear more free than historical actions.
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
(the theoretical people such as the drowning man.)
Abridged Versions: Line break in Dole at "relationship between Necessity and Free Will"
Start of Chapter 4 in Bell. No break at end.
Gibian: Line break instead of chapter break.
Additional Notes: Maude: "The Austro-Prussian war This conflict in 1866 occurred whilst Tolstoy was writing War and Peace."
Mentioned: an hour ago, twenty years before, centuries ago, a minute ago
Locations:
Mentioned: Austro-Prussian, Europe (and European)
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: The combination (or compatabilism) of free will and necessity is further explored in a series of theoretical cases, with the point being that an act appears more free and less necessary when seen from the point of view of far away. It is only when we get closer do we see how necessities (or what we might call conditions) drive those actions (and in it, we see Tolstoy give the idea that urban areas people are less free because they are under more conditions and necessities than a rural area). There is also how the concept of time affects our view of its freedom, as actions contemporary to us appear more free than historical actions.
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Napoleon III
Bismarck
Attila (see chapter 165)
(the theoretical people such as the drowning man.)
Abridged Versions: Line break in Dole at "relationship between Necessity and Free Will"
Start of Chapter 4 in Bell. No break at end.
Gibian: Line break instead of chapter break.
Additional Notes: Maude: "The Austro-Prussian war This conflict in 1866 occurred whilst Tolstoy was writing War and Peace."
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