Briggs: The flanking manoeuvre leading to Tarutino was natural and inevitable.
Maude (chapters 1-7): The cause of historical events. A survey of movements of the Russian army after leaving Moscow. Napoleons letter to Kutuzov. The camp at Tarutino. Alexander's letter to Kutuzov. Ermolov and others absent when wanted. The battle postponed. Kutuzov's wrath. The action next day. Cossacks surprise Murat's army and capture prisoners, guns and booty. Inactivity of the rest of the army
Pevear and Volokhonksy: Thoughts on the causes of historical events. Analysis of Russian movements after abandoning Moscow. Napoleon's letter to Kutuzov. Kutuzov's reply.
Translation:
Part the Second.
I.
For the human mind unavailable are the aggregate reasons of phenomena. But it is needed to look for causes invested in the human soul. And the human mind, not having penetrated in the countless complexity of the conditions of phenomena, from which each may separately present a reason, seizing for the first, very understandable convergence and say: here is the cause. In historical events (where the subject of security is the crux of the action of people) a very primitive convergence will present the will of gods, then will be those people that stand in a very prominent historical location — the historical heroes. Yet standing only to delve into the essence of each historical event, i.e. in the activity throughout the masses of people involved in the event, so that to make sure that the will of the historical hero not only does not lead the actions of the masses, but themselves are constantly led. It would seem, all care to understand the matters of historical events so otherwise. Yet between men who speak that peoples of the west went to the east because of how Napoleon wanted this, and the man who says that this was subjected because of how it must take place, exists that same difference which existed between people, who stated that the land stands firmly and the planets move around it, and those that said that they do not know what holds the land, but knows that there are laws, managers of movement of it and the other planets. The reasons of historical events — are not and may not be, besides the only cause of all reasons. Yet there are laws, managers of events, in part unknown, in part palpable to us. The opening of these laws are possible only then, when we quite renounce from finding the reasons in the will of one human, exactly so the same as the opening of the laws of the movements of planets has become possible only then when people renounce from the presentation of approval of the earth.
After the Borodino battle, the lessons of the enemy in Moscow and the burning of it, the most important episode of the war of the year 1812, the historians recognize the move of the Russian army from Ryazan to the Kaluga road and to the Tarutinskaya camp — the so called flank march behind the Red Pahra. Historians credited the glory of this ingenious feat to various faces and argue about who actually it belongs to. Even the foreign, even the French historians recognize the genius of the Russian generals, talking about this flank march. Yet why military writers, behind them all think that this flank march was a quite thoughtful invention of some one face, saved Russia and beat Napoleon, — is quite difficult to understand. First, it is difficult to understand in what consists the thoughtfulness and genius of these movements; so that to guess what was the very best position of the army (when it is not attacking) to find out where there is more food, does not need much mental strain. And everyone, even a daft thirteen year old boy without labor could guess that in the year of 1812 a very profitable position of the army, after the retreat from Moscow, was on the Kaluga road. So it cannot be understood, first, what inferences reach historians before so that to see something thoughtful in this maneuver. Second, it is still harder to understand in what historians see salvation in this maneuver for the Russians and disastrous in it for the French; for this flank march, as others previous, accompanied by ensuing circumstances, could be pernicious for the Russians and salvation for the French troops. If with this time, as subjected this move, the position of the Russian troops began to improve, that from this no way should it be for this move to be that reason.
This flank march not only could not bring some benefit, but could have ruined the Russian army, if it would not have been for coincidences in other conditions. What would it be if would not have burned Moscow? If Murat would not have lost from the view of the Russians? If Napoleon would not have been found out in inaction? If under the Red Pahra the Russian army, by the advice of Bennigsen and Barclay, would have given battle? What would have been, if the French would have attacked the Russians, when they went behind the Pahra? What would have been, if afterwards Napoleon, coming up to Tarutin, would have attacked the Russians, although with one tenth of the share of that energy with which he attacked at Smolensk? What would have been, if the French would have went to Petersburg?.. In all these assumptions, the salvation of the flank march could cross into disaster.
The third, and the most incomprehensible, consists in that people, studying the story, intentionally do not want to see that the flank march cannot be attributed to no one person, that no one ever foresaw it, that this manoeuvre, exactly so the same as the retreat to Fili, to the present no one ever presented to its wholeness, but step for step, event for event, moment for moment, flowed out from the countless quantity of the most diverse conditions, and only then presented throughout their wholeness, when it was accomplished and became past.
At the advice at Fili, the Russian superiors predominantly thought to themselves they understood the retreat by the direct direction backwards, i.e. by the Nizhny Novgorod road. The evidence to that serves that the majority of voices at the advice was served in this sense and, the main thing, is known the conversation after the council of the commander in chief with Lanskoy, in charge of the provisions part. Lanskoy denounced the commander in chief, that the food for the army gathered predominantly by Oka, in the Tula and Kaluga provinces, and that in the case of the retreats to lower, the stocks of food will be separated from the army by the large river of Oka, through which transportation in the first winter will be impossible. This was the first sign of the need for evasion from before presented a very natural straight direction to the lower. The army held to the south, by the Ryazan road, and nearer to the stocks. After the inaction of the French, lost even from the view of the Russian army, care about the protection of the Tula factory and, the main thing, the benefit of the approximation to its stocks, caused the army to stray still to the south, on the Tula road. Going in a desperate movement behind Pahra on the Tula road, the warlords of the Russian army thought to stay at Podolsk, and it was not thought about the Tarutinskaya positions; but a countless number of circumstances and the appearance again of the French troops, before lost from the view of the Russians, and projects the battle and, the main thing, the abundance of food at Kaluga caused our army to still more stray to the south and cross at the middle way to their food, from Tula on the Kaluga road, to Tarutin. Exactly so the same as it cannot be to respond to that question, when Moscow was abandoned, it cannot be to respond to that, when it was and by which it was decided to cross to Tarutin. Only then, when the troops came now to Tarutin owing to countless, differential forces, then it is only because people assure themselves that they would like this and a long time foresaw this.
Locations:
Mentioned: West, East, Borodino, Moscow, Russia (and Russian), Ryazan road, Kaluga road, camp of Tarutino, Krasnaya Pakhra (Dunnigan, Mandelker, and Briggs (the latter two don't capitalize) adds River), French, Smolensk, St. Petersburg, Fili, Nizhni-Novgorod, Oka, Tula, Kazan, Podolsk
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: Start of Part 2. Humanity is stuck in the contradiction of needing to know the cause of events while being unable to comprehend them, so simplifying causes is unavoidable. "between a man who says that the people of the west went to the east because Napoleon wanted it, and the man who says that it happened because it had to happen, there is the same difference as between the people who maintained that the earth stood still and the planets moved around it and those who said that they did not know what upheld the earth, but knew that there were laws governing its movement and that of the other planets."
Line break after "only when people gave up the notion that the earth stands still."
Tolstoy then takes the historical understanding of the flanking march that kept the French soldiers from retreating in the direction of fertile lands. Historians put a large emphasis on this and the Russian generals' plan for this happening, but Tolstoy says "anyone, even a stupid thirteen year old boy, would have no difficulty figuring out that the most advantageous position for the army in 1812, after the retreat from Moscow, was on the Kaluga road."
Importantly, "This flanking march might not only have failed to produce any advantages, but might have destroyed the Russian army, had it not been accompanied by a coincidence of other conditions."
The council in Fili is discussed, particularly how it was impossible for the council to see how events would play out. "Only when the troops had already reached Tarutino, owing to countless differential forces, only then did people begin to assure themselves that they had wanted it and had long foreseen it."
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Napoleon
Murat
Benigsen
Barclay
Kutuzof ("commander-in-chief")
Lanskoi ("Lanskoy" in Wiener, Maude, and Dunnigan. "Lauskoi" in Bell.)
Abridged Versions: Start of chapter 5 in Bell.
Start of Part Second in Dole.
Start of Part the Thirteenth in Wiener.
Start of Part Two in Dunnigan, Mandelker, Edmonds, and Briggs.
Start of Book Thirteen in Maude.
Start of Part Thirteen in Garnett.
Line break after "repudiated the notion of the fixity of the earth" in Dole. Line break in the same place in Bell, Mandelker, Garnett, and Dunnigan.
No break at the end in Bell.
Gibian: Start of Book Thirteen 1812.
Dates of Principal Historical Events
Old Style New Style
Oct. 6 Oct. 18 Battle of Tarutino.
Oct. 6, 7, 8 Oct. 18, 19, & 20 The French leave Moscow.
Oct. 12 Oct. 24 Battle of Malo-Yaroslavets.
Oct. 21 Nov. 2 Cossacks harry the French at Vyazma.
Line break instead of chapter break.
Fuller: Entire chapter is cut.
Komroff: Entire chapter is cut.
Kropotkin: Entire chapter is cut.
Bromfield: Chapter 20: The flanking maneuver is discussed and how the French army fell apart. "There were other causes, which I do not propose to list, but nor do I set forth a single, inadequate cause, claiming that as the only one."
Kutuzov repeats that he will make the French eat horseflesh and is willing to attack. However, Bennigsen undermines him and says that he had a wench dressed as a Cossack. How the different commanders undermined each other and lived fancily. Lauriston arriving and Kutuzov not giving him an answer is discussed. How Kutuzov undermined Bennigsen and made it harder for him to win battles is discussed.
"They were all good generals and good men, and I would never have mentioned their dancing and intrigues, had not all of them, annoyingly, written later in the style of Derzhavin on their love for the fatherland and the Tsar and similar such nonsense, whereas in actual fact they were mostly concerned with their dinner and a little blue ribbon, or a red one. This is a natural human aspiration, and it should not be condemned, but it must be called by its true name, otherwise it will mislead the younger generations as they gaze in astonishment and despair at the weaknesses which they discover in their own souls, while in Plutarch and Russian history they see nothing but heroes."
Tarutino is described, with Kutuzov described as a cautious professional huntsman. The French would rather just give up. "But they were all wretched and vile men who fully deserved all their sorrow, their pangs of conscience and desperate misfortune." The orders they give are not followed. Kutuzov on the other hand, does not give order, but knows to wait and "everything would happen of itself."
Simmons: Start of 1812 Book Thirteen: entire chapter is cut and replaced with "Tolstoy describes the flanking movement of the Russian forces beyond Moscow to the Kaluga road and the Tarutino battle, where Murat's forces are taken by surprise, and he insists that these two successful actions were, in the nature of things, inevitable and not the results of military foresight and careful planning. These actions, however, expose the weakness of the French and provide the shock which Napoleon's army awaited to begin its flight."
Additional Notes:
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