Briggs: Alexander, and others, urge attack. Kutuzov sees no need to risk lives.
Pevear and Volokhonsky: Problems of command in the Russian army. The emperor's letter to Kutuzov. A Cossack happens upon Murat's army near Tarutino.
Translation:
III.
The Russian army was managed by Kutuzov with his staff and the sovereign from Petersburg. In Petersburg, still before receiving the news about the abandonment of Moscow, was formed a detailed plan throughout the war and it was sent to Kutuzov to guide it. Despite that this plan was formed on the assumption that Moscow was still in our hands, this plan was approved by the staff and adopted to execution. Kutuzov wrote only that distant diversions are always difficult to perform. And, for approval was met the difficult, sent new instructions and face required to observe behind its actions and convey about them.
Besides this, now in the Russian army was transformed all the staff. Replaced were the places of the murdered Bagration and the offended, retired Barclay. It was quite seriously pondered what would be better: A. to be placed in the place of B., or B. in place of D., or, the opposite, D. in the place of A. and etc., as if something, besides the pleasure of A. and B., could depend from this.
In the staff of the army, by the occasion of the hostility of Kutuzov with his chief of staff, Bennigsen, and the presence of trusted persons of the sovereign and these movements, went more than usual the complex game of parties: A. digging in under B., D. under C. and etc., in all possible displacements and combinations. In all these underminings, the subject of intrigue for the most part was that military business, which think to lead all these people; but this military business was going whatever from them, it was so as it must go, i.e. never coinciding with that, what thought up people, but flowed out from the entities of the relationship of the masses. All this inventing, clashing, and entangling, presented in the higher sphere only the true reflection of what must take place.
"Prince Mihail Ilarionovich! — wrote the sovereign from the 2nd of October, in a letter, received after the Tarutinskaya battle. — From the 2nd of September Moscow is in the hands of the enemy. Your last reports are from 20th; and only during this time, not only that nothing was undertaken for action against the enemy and releasing the throne of the capitals, but even, by your last reports, you still retreat backwards. Serpuhov now is busy with a detachment of the enemy, and Tula, with its well-known and so for the army necessary factory, is in danger. By the reports from General Wintsengerode I see that an enemy of 10 000 corps is moving to the Petersburg road. Another, in several thousands, also serve to Dmitrov. A third moves forward by the Vladimir road. A fourth, quite significant, stands between Ruzoy and Mozhayck. Napoleon again by himself with a number of 25 is found out in Moscow. By all this information, when the enemy’s strong detachments shattered its forces, when Napoleon is still in Moscow itself, with his guard, whether it is possible, so that the forces of the enemy are located before you, were significant and not allowed you to act offensively? With the probability of the opposite, can it be to think that he haunts your detachments by at least the corps of a much weaker army than you trusted. It seems that taking advantage of these circumstances, could you with benefit attack an enemy weaker than you and exterminate it or at least, forcing him to back down, to keep in our hands the good part of the provinces, now the enemy is occupied, and by that very turning away the danger from Tula and the other interior of our cities. In your responsibility it will remain, if the enemy is in the condition to detach significant corps to Petersburg for the threat of this capital, which could not stay many troops, for with you is trusted the army, act with determination and activity, you have all the means to turn away this new misfortune. Remember that you still are required to answer the insulted homeland at the loss of Moscow. You have experienced my readiness to reward you. This readiness is not weak in me, but I and Russia have the right to expect from your parties only diligence, hardness and success, which your mind, your military talents and the bravery of the troops, led by you, we foreshadow."
Yet in that time of this letter, it was proved that the essential attitude of the forces now reflected in Petersburg, was on the road, Kutuzov could now not hold to command the army from an offensive, and battle now was given.
On the 2nd of October the Cossack Shapovalov, found in traveling, killed from a gun one and shot another hare. Chasing for the shot down hare, Shapovalov wandered a long away in the forest and stumbled on the left flank of the army of Murat, standing without all caution. The Cossack laughingly told his friends, as he a little bit was not caught by the French. A cornet, upon hearing this story, informed his commander.
The Cossack was conscribed and asked; the Cossack commanders would like to benefit from this case, so beat off horses, but one of the chiefs, familiar with the higher ranks of the army, informed this fact to the staff general. In the latter time in the staff army the position was to a higher extent stretched. Ermolov, a few days before this, coming to Bennigsen, begged him to consume their influence in the commander in chief, so that was made an offensive.
— If I would not have known you, I would have thought that you did not want what you ask for. It costs me to advise another, so that the lordly for sure does the opposite, — was the response of Bennigsen.
The news of the Cossacks, confirming the sent traveling, proved the final maturity of events. The pulled string jumped off, and hissed the watch, and started playing the chimes. Despite all his imaginary power, in his mind, experience, and knowledge of people, Kutuzov, accepting in attention the note of Bennigsen, who sent personally reports of the sovereign, expressed by all generals one and that same wish, the alleged wish of the sovereign and brought together by the Cossacks, now could not hold the inevitable movements and, gave back the order to that what he counted useless and harmful — the blessed accomplished fact.
Mentioned: 2d of September, the 20th, 25th, several days before
Locations: Tarutino
Mentioned: Russia (and Russian), St. Petersburg, Moscow, Serpukhov, Tula, Dmitrov, Vladimir, Ruza, Mozhaysk
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: The Russian leadership has a rather large shakeup and because of the conflicting personalities, it plays out like an algebra or logic problem that has no bearing on actual realities. Alexander sends a letter to Kutuzov asking why he is not acting. By the time Kutuzov receives the letter, the attack has already begun because he could not stop it.
Moving from the large overhead/leader-based view, we go to a simple Cossack who wandered into French territory, which causes the Russian forces to beg for an attack. Kutuzov finds himself stuck ordering something he finds useless, which is to attack.
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Prince Mikhail Ilarionovitch Kutuzof (also "commander-in-chief")
Alexander ("sovereign")
Bagration
Barclay
Benigsen (also "his chief of staff")
General Winzengerode
Napoleon (and his Guard)
Shapovalof (a Cossack. "Shapovalov" in Wiener, Briggs, and Dunnigan. "Schapovalow" in Bell. Also his comrades and the cornet who tells his commander. Also Cossack chiefs.)
Murat
Yermolof
Abridged Versions: No break in Bell.
Gibian: line break instead of chapter break.
Fuller: Entire chapter is cut.
Komroff: Entire chapter is cut.
Kropotkin: Chapter 2: We cut out the information about the changes in the staff and the debate surrounding it, getting to Alexander's letter much more quickly. Line break at end.
Simmons: Entire chapter is cut.
Additional Notes:
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