Briggs: Napoleon, the 'genius', made all the wrong decisions in Moscow.
Maude (chapters 8-10): Napoleon's measures. Proclamation in Moscow. Effects of pillage on French discipline
Pevear and Volokhonsky (chapters 8-10): Commentary on Napoleon in Moscow. The emperor's proclamations to the citizens. Looting and breakdown of discipline. Napoleon learns of the battle of Tarutino. Orders departure of the whole army.
Translation:
VIII.
Napoleon marches into Moscow after the brilliant victory de la Moskowa (of Moscow); doubting the victory may not be, as the field of battle stays so for the French. The Russians retreat and give back the capital. Moscow, filled with provisions, weapons, shells and innumerable riches, is in the hands of Napoleon. The Russian army twice weaker than the French, in the continuation of months makes not one attempt of attack. The position of Napoleon is very brilliant. So that with double forces pile up on the leftovers of the Russian army and to exterminate it, so that to pronounce the benefit of peace or, in the case of rejection, to make a threatening move to Petersburg, so that even, in the case of failures, to return to Smolensk or to Vilna, or stay in Moscow; for, by one word, so hold that brilliant position in which was found out at that time the French army, it would seem not needed is special genius. For this it was needed to do the very simple and easy: not allow the army to rob, prepare winter clothes, which would be gotten in Moscow by all the army, and right gathering found out in Moscow more than six months (by the appearance of the French historians) of provisions for the troops alone. Napoleon, this genius of geniuses and having the power to manage the army, as assert historians, did nothing of this.
He not only did nothing of this, but, the opposite, used his power in that, for out of all the presented to him ways and activities to choose that what was dumber and only more pernicious. Only of, what could be done by Napoleon: hibernate in Moscow, go to Petersburg, go to Nizhny Novgorod, go backwards, north or to the south, by that path which Kutuzov went then, well what would figure out, the dumber and more pernicious that was done by Napoleon, i.e. stay to October in Moscow, leave the troops to rob the city, then hesitating leaving the garrison, to exit from Moscow, come to Kutuzov, not start a battle, to go to the right, to reach to Malo Yaroslav, again not testing the randomness to break through, to go not by that road by which went Kutuzov, but to go backwards on the Mozhayck by the ravaged Smolensk road — dumber than this, more pernicious for the troops nothing can be figured out as that, and showed the consequences. Let the most skillful strategies think up, presenting to themselves what objective of Napoleon consisted in so that to ruin his army, think up another row of action, which would with such the same undoubted and independence from only what would have undertaken the Russian troops, would ruin so completely all of the French army, as that what was done by Napoleon.
The ingenious Napoleon did this. But to say that Napoleon ruined his army because of how he wanted to do this or because of how he was very stupid, would be exactly so the same unfair as to say that Napoleon led his troops to Moscow because of how he wanted to do this, and because of how he was very smart and a genius.
In this and the other case, the property of his activity has no more force than the property of the activity of each soldier, only coinciding with those laws, by which was committed the phenomenon.
Completely falsely (only because of how the consequences are not justified by the activities of Napoleon) historians present us the forces of Napoleon weakening in Moscow. He exactly so the same as before, as after in the 13th year, used all his skill and forces in that, so that to do the best for himself and his army. The activity of Napoleon for this time was not less amazing than in Egypt, in Italy, in Austria and in Prussia. We do not know rightly about to what extent was the valid genius of Napoleon in Egypt, where 40 centuries looked on his greatness, because of how all of these great exploits are described to us only by the French. We cannot rightly judge about his genius in Austria and Prussia, as the intelligence about his activities there must be scooped from French and German sources; but the incomprehensible surrender in captivity of the corps without battles and fortresses without siege should incline the Germans to the recognition of genius as to the only explanation of that war which was conducted in Germany. Yet we admit his genius, so that to hide their shame, thank God, is no cause. We paid for that, so to have the right to simply look at all the business, and we do not yield this right.
His activity in Moscow was so the same amazing and ingenious, as everywhere. Orders behind orders and plans behind plans went out from him to the time of his entry in Moscow and to the exit from it. The absent inhabitants and deputations, and the very fire of Moscow, did not confuse him. He did not miss from the view of the good of his army, the action of the enemy, the good of the peoples of Russia, the management of business in Paris, or diplomatic considerations about the lying ahead conditions of peace.
Mentioned: half a year, October, 1813, forty centuries
Locations: Moscow (Moskowa in the French)
Mentioned: French, Russia (and Russian), St. Petersburg, Smolensk, Vilna, Nizhni-Novgorod, Maly Yaroslavets (Malo-Yaloslavets in Maude. Maloyaroslavets in Briggs. Maley Yaroslavets in Garnett. Malo-Yaroslavets in Mandelker and Dunnigan. Malo-Yaroslavetz in Bell and Dole.), Mozhaysk, Egypt, Italy, Austria, Prussia, Germany (and German), Paris
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: We flip to Napoleon. "to hold on to the brilliant position the French army was in at the time, would seem to require no special genius...he used his power in order to choose, out of all the paths of action presented to him, the one which was the most stupid and destructive."
However, just as Napoleon's genius cannot be the attribute which led to his victories, his stupidity did not lead to his failures, but "merely coincided with the laws according to which the phenomenon was accomplished." Tolstoy quickly reflects on how we only really rely on French sources for his victories in Egypt and he clearly doesn't trust the German sources for his wars against the Austrians.
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Napoleon (with the expository form of the chapter, debatable whether or not he is an actual included character.)
Kutuzof
(also French and Russian armies. Also historians and Germans.)
Abridged Versions: Start of Chapter 6 in Bell. Line break instead of chapter break at the end.
Gibian: Chapter 2: line break instead of chapter break.
Fuller: Entire chapter is cut.
Komroff: Start of Book Thirteen: 1812. We pick up with Napoleon remaining in Moscow until October with his army pillaging. That is the only paragraph that is preserved. No line break.
Kropotkin: Entire chapter is cut.
Simmons: Chapter 2: the chapter breaks off a little early, cutting out the thoughts about the German surrender and the mention of Paris and anticipation of peace. Line break instead of chapter break.
Edmundson: Act 4 Scene 14: Napoleon complains of the looting to an aide and de Beausset. He decides that if Kutuzov doesn't move, he know has to.
Act 4 Scene 15: Andrei's death is an awakening scene. Strangely, the play, whether purposefully or not, does not have Andrei knowing about the death of his father.
Additional Notes:
Additional Notes:
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