Briggs: Four good reasons why the Russians did not cut off the French.
Maude: Why the French were not cut off by the Russians
Pevear and Volokhonsky: Critique of Russian historical accounts.
Translation:
XIX.
Who of the Russian people, reading the descriptions of the last period of the campaign of the year 1812, has not felt a heavy feeling of annoyance, dissatisfaction and ambiguity? Who has not assigned themselves issues: how was not taken away, not destroyed all the French, when all three armies surrounded them in superior numbers, when the disturbed French, hungry and frozen, gave up in droves and when (as we tell the story) the objective of the Russians consisted in to stop, cut off and pick up in captivity all the French?
In what way the Russian army, which, weaker in number than the French, gave the Borodino battle, in what way this army, with three parties surrounding the French and having the purpose to pick them up, did not reach their goal? Is it really such a huge advantage before us to have the French that we, surrounding them with excellent forces, could not beat them? In what way could this happen?
History (that, which is called by this word), answering to these questions, speaks that this happened because of how Kutuzov, Tormasov, and Chichagov, and that, and that, had not done these and those maneuvers.
Yet from what had they not done all these maneuvers? From what, should they be blamed in this, how was not achieved the intended objective, — from what were they not judged and not executed? Yet, even should we allow that the guilty failures of the Russians were Kutuzov and Chichagov and so on, it cannot be to understand all the same, why and in those conditions, at which were found out the Russian troops under Red and under Berezina (in both cases the Russians were in superior forces), why were not taken in the captivity French army with the marshals, kings and emperor, when in this was consisted the objective of the Russians?
The explanation of this strange phenomena is that (as that is done by Russian military historians) Kutuzov hindered the attack, unreasonably because of how we know that the will of Kutuzov could not hold the troops from attack under Vyazma and under Tarutin.
For some reason the Russian army, which with the weakest forces won victory under Borodino above the enemy throughout its strength, in superior forces, was vanquished under Red and under Berezina by the disturbed in droves French.
If the objective of the Russians consisted in so to cut off and take in captivity Napoleon and marshals, and this objective not only was not achieved, and all attempts to achieve these goals at any time were destroyed in a very shameful way, then the last period of the campaign completely fairly presents the French with nearby victories and completely unfairly presents the Russian historians as victorious.
Russian military historians, so, as far as for them is obligatory logic, unwittingly come to this conclusion and, despite lyrical appeals about courage and devotion and etc., must unwittingly admit that the retreat of the French from Moscow is a row of victories for Napoleon and defeats for Kutuzov.
Yet, leaving completely to the side people's pride, we feel that this conclusion itself concludes in a contradiction, as the row of victories of the French brought them to perfect destruction, but the row of defeats of the Russians brought them to the complete destruction of the enemy and cleansing their fatherland.
The spring of this contradiction lies in that historians, studying events by the letters of sovereigns and generals, by communications, reports and so on, suggest a false, never existing objective of the last period of the war of the year of 1812, as if the objective would consist in so that to cut off and catch Napoleon with the marshals and army.
These goals never were and could not be, because of how it had no sense, and the achievement of it was completely impossible.
This objective had no sense firstly because of how the disturbed army of Napoleon with all possible speed ran from Russia, i.e. carried out that very thing, what could want any Russian. for what the same was there to do various operations above the French, which ran so fast, as only they could?
Secondly, it was pointless to kneel in the way of people, all of their energy directed in escape.
Thirdly, it was pointless to lose their troops for the destruction of the French armies, destroyed without external reasons in such a progression, that without any obstructions in the way could not transfer abroad more than how they transferred in December, i.e. only one hundredth of the troops.
Fourthly, it was pointless to wish to take in captivity the emperor, kings, and dukes, — the people whose captivity to the highest extent would have impeded the action of the Russians, as that was recognized by the most skillful diplomats of this time (J. Maistre and others). More senseless was the wish to take the corps of the French, when their troops melted to half before Red, but to the corps captives it was needed to detach a division of convoy, and then their soldiers did not always receive full provisions and already taken away captives died from hunger.
All the thoughtful plans for cutting off and catching Napoleon with the army, was similar to that plan of the gardener, who, kicking out of the vegetable garden the trampling his ridges cattle, would run in to the gate and begin by the head to beat this cattle. One could say in excuse of the gardener that he was very angered. Yet this cannot be to even say about the compilers of the project, because of how they have not suffered from the trampled ridge.
Yet besides how cutting off Napoleon with his army was pointless, it was impossible.
This was impossible firstly because of how, as from experience it is seen that the move of columns for five versts in one battle never matches with plans, the probability that Chichagov, Kutuzov and Wittgenstein agreed in the time and appointed place, was so insignificant, that it equaled an impossibility; as that thought Kutuzov, still in receiving the plan saying that diversions in large distances do not bring the desired results.
Secondly it was impossible because of how, so that to paralyze that force of inertia, with which moved backwards the army of Napoleon, the need was to without the comparisons of bigger troops, than those which the Russians had.
Thirdly, this was impossible because of how the military word cut off, has no sense. One can cut off a piece of bread, but not an army. To cut off an army — to block its road — in no way cannot be, for the places around are always so many, where it can be to walk around, and at night, in the time which nothing is seen, than could make sure military scientists from the examples of Red and Berezina. To take again in captivity in no way can be without that, who is taken in captivity has agreed in this, as it cannot be to catch a swallow, than when it sits down in one’s hands. To take in captivity can be that who gives up as the Germans by the rules, strategies and tactics. Yet the French troops completely fairly did not find this comfortable, as an equally hungry and cold death awaited them in flight and in captivity.
Fourthly and the main thing, this was impossible because of how never, since existed the world, was a war in those scary conditions in which it happened in the year of 1812, and the Russian troops in the pursuit of the French strained all their forces and could not do more, not destroying themselves.
In the movement of the Russian army from Tarutin to Red dropped out fifty thousand sick and backward, i.e. a number equal to the population of many provincial cities. Half the people dropped out of the army without battles.
And about this period of the campaign, when the troops without boots and fur coats, with incomplete provisions, without vodka, by months spending the night in the snow in 15 degrees of frost; when the day was only 7 and 8 hours, but the rest of the night, in the time which may not be the influence of discipline; when, not so as in battle, in a few hours only people are introduced in the region of death, where already is no discipline, but when people by months live, all moments fighting with death from hunger and cold; when in a month is killed half the army, — about this period of the campaign we are told by historians, how Miloradovich should have done a flank march there, but Tormasov there, and how Chichagov should have moved there (moving in higher than knee snow), and how that knocked over and cut off, and etc. and etc.
The Russians, dying by half, had done all that can be done and must do for achieving the glorious to the people goal, and not to blame in that other Russian people, sitting in warm rooms, supposed to do that what was impossible.
All this strange, incomprehensible now contradiction to the facts with written history, goes on only because of how the historians who wrote about this event, wrote the story of beautiful feeling and words of different generals, but not the story of events.
For them appear very entertaining the words of Miloradovich, awards which received that and this general and their assumptions; but the question about those 50 000 that stayed by hospitals and graves, not even interests them, because of how they are not subject to their studying.
But between that stands only to turn away from studying reports and general plans, but to delve into the movement of those hundred thousand people, hosting direct participation in the event, and all the seeming before insoluble questions, suddenly, with extraordinary ease and simplicity receives undoubted approval.
The objective of cutting off Napoleon with his army never existed, besides as in the imagination of ten people. It could not exist, because of how it was senseless, and its achievement was impossible.
The objective of the people was one: clear their land from invasions. This objective was achieved firstly itself, as the French ran and because it should only be to not stop these movements. Secondly, this objective was achieved by the actions of the folk war, destroying the French, and thirdly by that the big Russian army went following behind the French, finishing to consume the force in the case of stops in the movements of French.
The Russian army was to act as the whip to a running animal. And the experienced driver knew that it was very profitable to keep the whip raised, threatening them, but not by head lashing the running animal.
—————
Mentioned: 1812
Locations:
Mentioned: Russia (and Russian), French, Borodino, Krasnoe, Berezina, Vyazma, Tarutino, Moscow, German
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: Still sticking with a birdseye view, Tolstoy discusses the frustration Russians feel that the entire French army wasn't cut off and destroyed. His main enemy here is now Russian historians who blame Kutuzov and give Napoleon credit for victories, a contradiction that Tolstoy believes exists because the aim of capturing Napoleon and destroying his army was not the aim and could not have been the aim. While Tolstoy breaks the argument into different parts, the main thrust is that the French were fleeing at a speed that the Russians could not wish to catch them and that the expulsion of the French from Russia was the chief goal.
One of the most interesting arguments is that the ability to cut off an army is "impossible, because there is always plenty of room for it to go around, and there is the night, during which nothing can be seen". Notably, unlike "Germans", the French were not willing to surrender because captivity would still mean "hunger and cold".
Tolstoy also puts emphasis on the amount of soldiers that the Russians lost in their pursuit, with half of them dropping out of the army before there was a single battle. "The Russians, dying by half, did all they could do and should have done to achieve an aim worthy of the nation, and are not to blame if other Russian people, sitting in warm rooms, proposed doing what was impossible."
End of Part Three.
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Kutuzof
Tormasof
Chitchagof ("Tchitchagov" in Garnett. "Tchichagov" in Edmonds. "Chichagov" in Maude, Briggs, and Dunnigan.)
Napoleon (and his marshals)
J. Maistre (as in Dole and Wiener. See Bromfield in post on chapter 88 and Pevear and Volkhonsky note in chapter 193. "Joseph de Maistre" in Maude, Edmonds, and Mandelker. Bell cuts the name.)
Wittgenstein
Miloradovitch
(Russians and French are mentioned in general, as are Russian military historians. Also a theoretical gardener, cattle-driver, military students, and the Germans.)
Abridged Versions:
End of Part Fourteen in Garnett.
End of Part the Fourteenth in Wiener.
End of Book Fourteen in Maude.
End of Part Three in Edmonds, Briggs, Mandelker, and Dunnigan.
End of Part Third in Dole.
End of Chapter 14 in Bell.
Gibian: Chapter 5: End of Book Fourteen.
Fuller: entire chapter is cut.
Komroff: entire chapter is cut.
Kropotkin: entire chapter is cut.
Simmons: Chapter 5: the opening paragraph that sets up context is removed. The discussion of specific commanders that have been blamed by historians is removed. End of Book Fourteen.
Additional Notes:
Claridge: "His (Tolstoy's) readings of the works of Joseph de Maistre (extensively discussed by Sir Isaiah Berlin), the Sardinian Ambassador in St Petersburg between 1803-17, helped form his sense that historical events are not shaped by the individual will, no matter how much that will sees itself as the shaping force."
Mandelker: (on Maistre) "noted...for his passionate defence of 'throne and altar' conservatism. His energetic writing style and forceful, ardently held royalist beliefs made him a compelling counter-cultural figure in the aftermath of the French Revolution...(Isaiah) Berlin discuss De Maistre as a forerunner of modern fascism..."
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