Briggs: The campaign before Borodino. Kutuzov's subsequent movements.
Maude: Summary of campaign before Borodino, and explanation of Kutuzov's subsequent movements
Pevear and Volokhonsky: General reflections on the Russian retreat after Borodino and the role of the commander in chief.
Translation:
II.
The forces of twelve languages of Europe broke into Russia. The Russian army and population retreats, avoiding confrontation before Smolensk and from Smolensk to Borodino. The French army with constantly increasing force impetuously carry to Moscow, to the goals of their movements. The power of its impetuosity, with the approach to the goals, increases like the increase of fast falling bodies, by its least approximations to land. Back a thousand versts is a hungry, hostile country; ahead ten versts, separated from the goals. This feels any soldier of the Napoleonic army, and the invasion looming over itself, by one strength of impetuosity.
In the Russian troops, at least by the retreats, all more and more flares up a spirit of bitterness against the enemy: stepping backwards, it focuses and builds up. Under Borodino goes on a collision. That another army does not break apart, the Russian army directly after the confrontation retreats so the same necessarily, as necessarily rolls back an orb, facing with another, with more swiftness rushing at it ball; and also necessarily (although suffered all its forces in the collision) swiftly scattered the orb of invasions rolling in some more space.
The Russians retreat to 120 versts — for Moscow, the French reach to Moscow and there stop. In the continuation of five weeks after this is not one battle. The French do not move. Like a deadly-wounded beast, which, shedding blood, licks their wounds, they for five weeks stay in Moscow, undertaking nothing, and suddenly without every new cause run backwards: throw on the Kaluga road and (after victory, as again the field of battle was left behind them under Little-Yaroslav), not marching in one serious battle, run still faster backwards to Smolensk, behind Smolensk, behind Vilna, behind Berezina, and onwards.
On the night of the 26th of August, Kutuzov and all the Russian army were sure that the Borodino battle was won. Kutuzov so wrote the sovereign. Kutuzov ordered to prepare to a new battle, so that to finish the enemy not because he wanted to betray someone, but because of how he knew that the enemy was conquered, so the same as this was known to every participant of the battle.
Yet on that same night and on the next day came one behind another, news about losses unheard of, about the loss of half the army, and the new battle manifested as physically impossible.
It cannot be to give the battle, when still not gathered was intelligence, not removed wounded, not replenished shells, not numbered dead, not assigned new chiefs in the places of the slain, and not eating and not getting enough sleep people. But together with that now the same after the battle, on another morning; the French army (by that impetuous strength of movements, increased now as would be in reverse regarding the squares of distances) now was coming itself to the Russian army. Kutuzov wanted to attack on the next day, and all the army wanted this. Yet so that to attack, was not enough willingness to do this; the need for the opportunity to do this was, but this opportunity was not. It could not be to retreat in one transition, then exactly so the same it could not be to retreat on the next and third transition, and finally the 1st of September, when the army came up to Moscow — despite all the force of rising feeling in the ranks of troops, the power of things demanded so that these troops went for Moscow. And the troops retreated more in one to the last transition and gave Moscow to the enemy.
For those people that are used to thinking that the plans of wars and battles are formed by generals so the same way, as everyone of us, sitting in his office above maps, makes considerations about how he would have ordered at such and such battle, presents the questions, why Kutuzov in retreat did not enter so and so, why he did not occupy the positions before Fili, why he did not step back right away to the Kaluga road, leaving Moscow and etc. People, accustomed to think so, forget or do not know those inevitable conditions, in which there were always going on in the activity of any commander in chief. The activity of a commander has not the slightest similarities with that activity, which we imagine to ourselves, sitting free in an office, sorting some campaign on a map with the famous quantity of troops, with that and with other parties, and on a famous terrain begin our considerations with some famous moment. The commander in chief is never able in those conditions to begin some events, in which we always examine an event. The commander in chief is always located in the middle of a moving number of events and so, never, in which moment, he is not in the condition to think out all matters of ongoing events. Events unnoticed, moment behind moment, cut out in their matters, and in every moment of this consistent, continuous cutting of events, the commander in chief is located in the center of the most difficult game, intrigue, worries, addictions, authorities, projects, advice, threats, deceptions, and located constantly in the need to respond to the countless number proposed to him, often contradicting one another, issues.
We modestly speak of scientists of the military that Kutuzov still much before Fili should move his troops to the Kaluga road, that even someone suggested such a project. Yet before the commander in chief, especially at a difficult moment, is not one project, but always dozens at the same time. And everyone of these projects, established in strategies and tactics, contradict one another. The business of the commander in chief, it would seem, consists only in so that to choose one of these projects. But this he may not do. Events and time do not wait. His offer, placed on the 28th to cross to the Kaluga the road, but at this time jumps an adjutant from Miloradovich and asks whether to tie now the business with the French or to retreat. His need now, at this moment, was to give orders. But the orders to retreat knocks us down from turning on the Kaluga road. And following behind the adjutant a quartermaster asks where to carry provisions, but the chief of state hospitals, — where to carry the wounded; but a courier from Petersburg brings a letter from the sovereign, not admitting the opportunity to leave Moscow, but the rival of the commander in chief, that who undermines below him (such always are not one, but a few) offers a new project, diametrically opposite to the plan of exiting on the Kaluga road; but forces the commander in chief himself to require sleep and reinforcements; but a bypassed for reward venerable general comes to complain, but the residents beg about protection; the sent officer for the inspection of terrain comes and informs completely opposite to that what was spoken before by his sent officer; but a scout, captive and made a reconnaissance general, all describes a different position of the enemy army. People, accustomed not to understand or forget these necessary conditions of the activities of any commander in chief, present to us, for example, the position of troops at Fili and in this suggests that the commander in chief could on the 1st September completely freely consent to the question about the abandonment or protection of Moscow, then as at the position of the Russian army at 5 versts from Moscow, this issue could not be. When the same was decided this question? Under Drissa, and under Smolensk, and more noticeably only on the 24th under Shevardin, and the 26th under Borodino, and at every day, hour and moment of the retreats from Borodino to Fili.
Mentioned: five weeks, one day, second day, third day, one more day, August 28th, 24th
Locations:
Mentioned: Europe, Russian, Smolensk, Borodino, French, Moscow, Kaluga, Malo-Yaroslavets (Maloyaroslavets in Briggs and Pevear and Volkhonsky), Vilna, Berezina, Fili, St. Petersburg, Drissa, Shevardino
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: We pick up the ideas of the previous chapter to try to explain the movement of the French troops and the Russian retreat. "the Russian army retreats of necessity, just as a ball rebounds of necessity after colliding with another ball coming towards it at a greater speed".
Reminder that Kutuzov believed that Borodino was won and had written to Alexander as such, but he could not offer battle again. "A commander in chief always finds himself in the middle of a shifting series of events, and in such a way that he is never able at any movement to ponder all the meaning of the ongoing event."
The complication and suddenness of each decision makes abstract planning impossible.
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Napoleon
Kutuzof (also "commander-in-chief")
Alexander (only "sovereign")
Miloradovich
Abridged Versions: Bell appears to have a line break before "By sunset on the 7th of September Koutouzow..." End of chapter is end of chapter 9. Edmonds does not put her usual star to symbolize a line break before "Learned military critics assure us", but does put at least a space between paragraphs.
Gibian: Chapter 2.
Fuller: Entire chapter is cut.
Komroff: Entire chapter is cut.
Kropotkin: Start of 1812 Part Eleventh with the following intro: "Warfare between Napoleon and Russia with its vast population is the signal for the European satelites of France to rise against their foreign master. On the peninsula Wellington is now on the offensive; a rejuvenated Prussia gives lip service to its French alliance, while actually preparing to take the side of the Russians and the British; Austria is openly hostile and awaits only the proper moment to enter the war. Now is joined a contest in which Napoleon must conquer or lose all. The key is Russia; he keeps his place with his invading army and takes Moscow." The chapter gives us the information about the Russians retreating beyond Moscow and that for five weeks there was no battle and the French being compared to a wounded beast and that Kutuzof wanted another battle but could not give it and they could not prevent retreating, surrendering Moscow to the enemy. Basically all the philosophical ideas of the chapter are cut. No break.
Bromfield: Chapter 14: We get that after Borodino it is obvious that Moscow will be abandoned to Moscow and this idea did not come from the commander-in-chief but from the people of Moscow. No break, as it is only a couple of paragraphs of information, ending what I would call this chapter with "Everything that happened flowed from the essential nature of the matter itself, and the masses are fully aware of that essential nature."
Simmons: Chapter 2: most of the chapter is cut, with only the basics of what the armies and Kutuzov did after Borodino.
Additional Notes:
Troubetzskoy: Page 122: Footnote: "In his notes on The Year 1812 Davidov asserts that if Napoleon's 34-day stay in Moscow had been cut short by two weeks, none of Kutuzov's plans would have come to fruition and the French army could have reached Smolensk in fair weather and largely unmolested!"
Segur/Townsend: Page 139: “The town of Malo-Yaroslavetz, built of wood, had been set on fire and completely destroyed. Many men, both Russian and French, had been burned to death...He recalled how Peter the Great in a similar situation, though he had sacrificed ten Russians for every Swede, not only believed that the losses were equal, but that he had even got the better of the terrible bargain. The worst thing about it was the knowledge that this bloody encounter might have been avoided.”
Montefoire: Page 344: General Mikhail Miloradovich, governor-general of Petersburg, was best friends with Constantine whom he argued was the rightful tsar, whatever Alexander had decreed. Miloradovich, one of the heroes of Borodino, was an eccentric playboy, nicknamed “Bayard,” after the romantic French knight, for his womanizing in the city’s theaters which he treated as a personal harem. Now he continued seducing ballerinas”
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