Briggs: Kutuzov and his generals. To defend or not to defend Moscow?
Maude (chapters 3-4): Kutuzov and his generals at the Poklonny Hill, Council of War at Fili
Pevear and Volokhonsky: Kutuzov and his generals on Poklonnaya Hill, Kutuzov's inner debate.
Translation:
III.
The Russian troops, retreating from Borodino, were standing at Fili. Ermolov, riding for the inspection of positions, drove to the field marshal.
— To fight in these positions is no opportunity, — he said. Kutuzov with surprise looked at him and made him repeat the said words. When he spoke, Kutuzov held out his hand.
— Give me your hand, — he said, and, turning it, so to feel his pulse, he said: — You are unwell, darling. Think of what you speak.
Kutuzov at Poklon mountain, at six versts from the Dorogomilovsky outpost, got out from the crew and sat down on a bench at the edge of the road. A huge crowd of generals gathered around him. Count Rastopchin, having arrived from Moscow, joined to him. All this brilliant society, breaking into a few circles, talked between themselves about the benefits and disadvantages of positions, about the position of the troops, about the alleged plans, about the condition of Moscow, and about all the questions of the military. All felt that although they were not called upon to that, that although this was not so named, that this was a military advice. The conversations of all held in the area of common issues. Should someone inform or find out personal news, then about this was a spoken whisper, and immediately crossed again to the common questions: jokes, laughter, or smiles even, was not noticeable between all these people. All, obviously with effort, tried to hold to the height of the situation. And all groups, talking between themselves, tried to hold in proximity to the commander in chief (whose bench formed the center in these circles) and talked so he could hear them. The commander in chief listened to and sometimes asked again to that what was said around him, but himself did not march into conversation and did not express any opinions. For the most part, listening to the conversation of some circle, he with the look of disappointment — as if really not about what they said is what he desired to know, — turned away. Only talking about the selected positions, criticizing not so much the very position, as much as the mental abilities of those which chose it; others proved that the error was made before, that it was needed to accept the battle again on the third day; a third talked about the battle at Salamanca, about which talked only how arrived the French Krosar in a Spanish uniform. (This Frenchman together with one of the German princes served in the Russian army, assorted the siege of Saragossa, foreseeing so the same to protect Moscow.) In the fourth circle Count Rastopchin spoke about how he with the Moscow squad was ready to die under the walls of the capital, but that all the same he may not not regret about that suspense in which he was left, and that should he have known this before, it would be another... The fifth, showing the depth of their strategic considerations, talked about the direction which must be accepted by the troops. The sixth talked perfect nonsense. The face of Kutuzov became all more anxious and sadder. From all this talking Kutuzov saw alone: to protect Moscow was neither the physical opportunity in the full meaning of these words, i.e. to such an extent was not an opportunity, that, should some crazy commander in chief give the order about a country house battle, then would occur confusion, and the battle all the same would not be; would not be because of how all the higher chiefs not only recognized this position as impossible, but in their conversations discussed only that what will happen after the undoubted abandonment of this position. How again could chiefs lead their troops in a field of battle which they counted impossible? The inferior chiefs, even the soldiers (which also reason) also recognized the position as impossible and because of it could not go fight with certain defeat. If Bennigsen insisted in the protection of this position and others still discussed it, then this question now did not have meaning itself for themselves, but only had matters as a pretext for argument and intrigue. This understood Kutuzov.
Bennigsen, choosing the position, hotly exposing his Russian patriotism (which not without grimacing listened Kutuzov), insisted on the protection of Moscow. Kutuzov as clear as day saw the objective of Bennigsen: in the case of the failure to defend — dump the blame on Kutuzov, who brought the troops without battle to Sparrow Hills, but in the case of success — he would ascribe it to himself; in the case of rejection again— clear himself in the crime of the abandonment of Moscow. Yet this question of intrigue did not occupy the old man now. One terrible question occupied him. And to this question he from anyone did not hear an answer. The question consisted for him now was only in this: "Is it really that I allowed to Moscow Napoleon, and when again did I do this? When was this decided? Was it really yesterday, when I sent to Platov the order to retreat, or the third night, when I nodded off and ordered the Bennigsen order? Or still before?.. Yet when, when again was decided this scary business? Moscow should be abandoned. The troops must retreat, and I need to give this order." To give this scary order it seemed to him one and the same as to refuse from the command of the army. But little that he loved power, he was used it (an honor, given back to Prince Prozorovsky, in which he consisted in Turkey, teased him), he was convinced that he was intended for the salvation of Russia, and because of that alone, against the commitment of the sovereign and by the will of the people, he was elected commander in chief. He was convinced that he alone in these difficult conditions could hold in the head of the army, that he alone in all the world was in the condition of being without horror in knowing his opponent the invincible Napoleon; and he terrifiedly thought about this order, which he should give. Yet it was needed to solve something, needed to stop these conversations around him, which began to take a too free character.
He called upon himself the senior generals.
— Whether it is good, whether it is bad, my head relies on no one else, —734 he said, getting up from the bench, and went to Fili, where were standing his crews.
734 Ma tête, fut-elle bonne ou mauvaise, n’a qu’à s’aider d’elle même, (My head, were it good or bad, just has to help itself,)
Mentioned: yesterday, night before last
Locations: Poklonnaya Hill (Poklonny Hill in Maude), Fili
Mentioned: Moscow, Dorogomilov barrier (...gate in Maude, Dunnigan, and Briggs. Dorogomilovo gate in Pevear and Volokhonsky.), Salamanca, French, Spanish, German, Russia (and Russian), Saragossa, Sparrow Hills, Turkey
Pevear and Volokhonsky Notes: We follow Kutuzov after he calls Ermolov unwell for suggesting that they could not fight at the position they were in. Circles of conversation, in which Kutuzov does not participate in (the anti-Anna Pavlovna), surround the commander in chief. Again, just as with the plans of war after the French invade, Tolstoy gives us a breakdown of the many different camps of opinion. "A sixth talked total nonsense."
Kutuzov sees that the defense of Moscow is impossible. "if some insane commander in chief gave the order to offer battle, confusion would set in, and there would be no battle anyway".
Bennigsen tries to argue for defending Moscow and again patriotism irks Kutuzov (who also sees Bennigsen as being able to blame Kutuzov for failure and to take credit for himself if things do go well). Kutuzov contemplates the terrible question of when it was decided that Moscow would be abandoned.
"he was convinced that he was destined to save Russia, and only because of that, against the will of the sovereign and by the will of the people, was he chosen commander in chief."
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Yermolof
Kutuzof (also "commander-in-chief" and "the old man")
Count Rostopchin
Crossart (a Frenchman.)
Benigsen (his inclusion or just being mentioned in the chapter can be debated.)
Napoleon
Platof
Prince Piogorovsky ("...Prozorovski" in Maude. "Prozorovsky" in Briggs, Mandelker, and Garnett.)
Alexander (only "sovereign")
Abridged Versions: Start of Chapter 10 in Bell with no break at the end.
Gibian: Chapter 3: line break instead of chapter break at the end.
Fuller: Entire chapter is cut.
Komroff: The Ermolof opening is removed and we do not get the full list of the different opinions around Kutuzov, but we still get Count Rostopchin. An ellipsis, rather than a line break, ends the chapter early, removing what Kutuzov says at the end of the chapter to the generals, but instead we get a moved passage, as we get Kutuzov thinking about how he believed Russia won the battle of Borodino and that he wanted to lead the monster Napoleon into Russia, making him more defiant than defeated in this section. We then get a line break heading into the next chapter.
Kropotkin: Chapter appears preserved. No break.
Bromfield: No apparent corresponding chapter.
Simmons: Entire chapter is cut.
Additional Notes:
Mikaberidze:
Page 7: .since Cossack Ataman Matvei Platov, alarmed by Murat’s vigorous charges, withdrew his rearguard too soon, allowing the Allied cavalry to close on the main Russian army. Kutuzov, already dissatisfied with Platov’s performance at Borodino, was furious at this latest slip-up and replaced him at once with General Mikhail Mioradovich, whom he reinforced with four infantry and two Jager regiments, and one heavy rtillery company.”
Page 9: “Barclay de Tolly, worn out by fatigue and a feverish chill….General Alexei Yermolov, Barclay’s Chief of Staff, who had regularly expressed hostility towards his superior but had undergone a radical change of heart since Barclay’s heroic performance at Borodino. Yermolov emphatically agreed with Barclay, criticizing the position with such fervour that it prompted Kutuzov to take him by the wrist, check his pulse and inquire if he was feeling all right. But this was all part of Kutuzov’s charade. As Yermoolov correctly noted, many officers ‘already understod that Prince Kutuzov had no need for their ideas and simply wanted to show his resolve in defending Moscow when in reality he never even considered it.’ And so the farce continued.”
Rey/Emanuel: Page 242: "For the historian Andrey Ratchinski, the choice of Moscow is also explained by more symbolic objectives: in his conquest of the world, Napoleon aimed to consecrate his work by having himself crowned emperor of the Kremlin after conquering Moscow, "the third Rome." This assertion is interesting because it illustrates the ideological and symolic dimension of Napoleon's plan, showing how much the war of 1812 was a war of ideas, as much as of men....remove Barclay de Tolly from his role as commander in chief and to find a successor for him. In a letter to Catherine written in St. Petersburg in August 1812, Alexander explains why the committee's choice settled on General Kutuzov: (Page 243)..."we decided on Kutusoff as being the oldest and thereby giving Bennigsen the possibility of serving under him, for they are lined by friendship, too"...
Durant: Page 704: “All through September 7 these thousands of men, fearing, hating, killing, dying, fought their like with heroism and tenacity equal on either side, as if feeling that the destiny of Europe depended upon them...Kutuzov thought of renewing the battle, but as the figures of his losses came in he felt that he could not subject the survivors to another day of such slaughter.”
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