Chapter Summaries: Dole: Kutuzof decides to retreat from Krems to Znaim and Olmutz. Bagration sent across the mountains. "The impossible possible." A trick that failed. The armistice. Bonaparte's indignation at the delay. His letter to Prince Murat. Bagration's four thousand.
Briggs: Bagration is sent to Hollabrunn. Napoleon writes to Murat.
Translation:
XIV.
Kutuzov through his scout received the news of the 1st of November, putting his commanded army in an almost hopeless position. The scout reported that the French in huge forces, going by the Viennese bridge, were headed on the way to the posts of Kutuzov with troops, marching from Russia. If Kutuzov decided to stay in Krems, that one hundred and a half thousand soldier army of Napoleon would cut him off from all posts, would surround his forty thousand soldier exhausted army, and he would be found in the position of Mack below Ulm. Should Kutuzov decide to leave the road leading to the posts with troops from Russia, then he should march without roads on the unknown edges of the Bohemian mountains, defended from the excellent forces of the enemy, and leaving all hopes in a message with Buxhoeveden. Should Kutuzov decide to go back by the road from Krems to Olmutz to compound with the troops from Russia, then he risked being prevented on this road by the French crossing over the bridge at Vienna, and so be forced to accept battle in the campaign, with all the weight and wagons, and do business with an enemy three times superior to him and surrounding him with two parties.
Kutuzov elected this last exit.
The French, as reported by the scout, were going on the bridge from Vienna, reinforcingly marched to Znaim, lying in the way of the retreats of Kutuzov, ahead of him more than one hundred versts. Reaching Znaim before the French — meant to give big hopes to the salvation of the army; to give the French the opportunity to get to Znaim — meant for sure to subject all the army to shame, similar to Ulm, or general death. But to prevent the French with all the army was impossible. The road of the French from Vienna to Znaim was shorter and better than the road of the Russians from Krems to Znaim.
On the night of receiving the news Kutuzov sent the four thousand soldier vanguard of Bagration to the right mountain from the Krems to Znaim road to Vienna to Znaim. Bagration was to take without recreation this transition, stay facing Vienna and go backwards to Znaim, and should he succeed to prevent the French, then he should hold them up how much he could. Again Kutuzov with all his weight set off to Znaim.
Having passed with hungry, bloated soldiers, without roads, by the mountains, on a stormy night, forty five versts, having lost a third of his troops back, Bagration got out to Gollabrun on the Vienna to Znaim road several hours before the French approached Gollabrun from Vienna. Kutuzov needed to go still a whole day with his own wagons so to reach Znaim, and because of this, so to save the army, Bagration should with his four thousand hungry, tormented soldiers hold on for the continuation of a day all of the enemy army meeting with him at Gollabrun was, obviously, impossible. But strange fate made the impossible possible. The success of the deception, which without battle gave the Viennese bridge into the hands of the French, prompted Murat to try to deceive Kutuzov so the same. Murat, meeting the weak detachment of Bagration on the Znaim road, thought that this was the whole army of Kutuzov. So if to undoubtedly crush this army, he was waiting for straggling troops by the road from Vienna and with this purpose proposed a three day truce, with the condition that those and other troops not change their provisions and not move off from their places. Murat assured that there were already talks about peace and that in order to avoid useless spilling of blood, he offered truce. The Austrian General Count Nostits, standing at the outposts, believed the parliamentarian words of Murat and stepped back, opening the detachment of Bagration. A different parliamentarian went in the Russian chain to declare the same news about peace talks and to propose a truce with the Russian troops for three days. Bagration responded that he may not take or not take a truce, and with a report made about it sent the sentence to Kutuzov and his adjutant.
Truce for Kutuzov was the only way to win time, to give relaxation to the tormented detachment of Bagration and to let the wagons and weight pass (a move which was hidden from the French), in one excessive transition before Znaim. A proposal of truce gave the only unexpected opportunity to save the army. Receiving this news, Kutuzov immediately sent General-Adjutant Wintsengerode to the enemy camp. Wintsengerode was not only to accept the truce, but to propose conditions of capitulation, but between this Kutuzov sent his adjutants backwards to rush in how to possibly move the wagons throughout the army by the Krems to Znaim road. The tormented, hungry detachment of Bagration alone was, covering up by themselves this move of wagons throughout the army, still staying before the eight time stronger enemy.
The expectations of Kutuzov came true regarding that offers of capitulation, or why it was not binding, could give him time to take some parts of the wagons, and regarding that error Murat should open very soon. So only Bonaparte, found in Schonbrunn, at 25 versts from Gollabrunn, received the report of Murat and the project of truce and capitulation, saw the cheating and wrote the following letter to Murat:
Prince Murat. Schonbrunn, 25 Brumaire 1805. 8 in the morning.
I cannot find the words to express to you my displeasure. You command only my vanguard and do not have the right to make a truce without my orders. You force me to lose the fruits of the whole campaign. Immediately tear up the truce and go against the enemy. You announce to that general that signed this capitulation, he had no right, and no one does, excluding only the Russian emperor.
However, if the Russian emperor will agree on the mentioned condition, I also agree; but this is nothing other than cunning. Go, demolish the Russian army... You may take her wagons and her artillery.
The general-adjutant of the Russian emperor is lying... the officers mean nothing, when the authorities don’t have authority; he also does not have it... The Austrians gave themselves to deceit at the transition of the Viennese bridge, but you give yourself to the deceit of the adjutants of the emperor.
Napoleon.307
The adjutant of Bonaparte in all the agility of the horses galloped with this formidable letter to Murat. Bonaparte himself, not trusting his generals, with all his guard moved to advance the battle, fearing to miss the ready victim, but the 4000 soldier detachment of Bagration, funnily laying fires, dried, heated, and cooked for the first time after three days of porridge, and none of the people of the detachment knew or thought about what was happening to them.
307
Au prince Murat. Schoenbrunn, 25 brumaire en 1805 à huit heures du matin.
“Il m’est impossible de trouver des termes pour vous exprimer mon mécontentement. Vous ne commandez que mon avant-garde et vous n’avez pas le droit de faire d’armistice sans mon ordre. Vous me faites perdre le fruit d’une campagne. Rompez l’armistice sur-le-champ et marchez à l’ennemi. Vous lui ferez déclarer, que le général qui a signé cette capitulation, n’avait pas le droit de le faire, qu’il n’y a que l’Empereur de Russie qui ait ce droit.
“Toutes les fois cependant que l’Empereur de Russie ratifierait la ditè convention, je la ratifierai; mais ce n’est qu’une ruse. Marchez, detruisez l’armée russe... vous êtes en position de prendre son bagage et son artillerie.
“L’aide-de-camp de l’Empereur de Russie est un... Les officiers ne sont rien quand ils n’ont pas de pouvoirs: celui-ci n’en avait point... Les Autrichiens se sont laissé jouer pour le passage du pont, de Vienne, vous vous laissez jouer par un aide-decamp de l’Empereur.
Napoléon.”
Briggs: Bagration is sent to Hollabrunn. Napoleon writes to Murat.
Translation:
XIV.
Kutuzov through his scout received the news of the 1st of November, putting his commanded army in an almost hopeless position. The scout reported that the French in huge forces, going by the Viennese bridge, were headed on the way to the posts of Kutuzov with troops, marching from Russia. If Kutuzov decided to stay in Krems, that one hundred and a half thousand soldier army of Napoleon would cut him off from all posts, would surround his forty thousand soldier exhausted army, and he would be found in the position of Mack below Ulm. Should Kutuzov decide to leave the road leading to the posts with troops from Russia, then he should march without roads on the unknown edges of the Bohemian mountains, defended from the excellent forces of the enemy, and leaving all hopes in a message with Buxhoeveden. Should Kutuzov decide to go back by the road from Krems to Olmutz to compound with the troops from Russia, then he risked being prevented on this road by the French crossing over the bridge at Vienna, and so be forced to accept battle in the campaign, with all the weight and wagons, and do business with an enemy three times superior to him and surrounding him with two parties.
Kutuzov elected this last exit.
The French, as reported by the scout, were going on the bridge from Vienna, reinforcingly marched to Znaim, lying in the way of the retreats of Kutuzov, ahead of him more than one hundred versts. Reaching Znaim before the French — meant to give big hopes to the salvation of the army; to give the French the opportunity to get to Znaim — meant for sure to subject all the army to shame, similar to Ulm, or general death. But to prevent the French with all the army was impossible. The road of the French from Vienna to Znaim was shorter and better than the road of the Russians from Krems to Znaim.
On the night of receiving the news Kutuzov sent the four thousand soldier vanguard of Bagration to the right mountain from the Krems to Znaim road to Vienna to Znaim. Bagration was to take without recreation this transition, stay facing Vienna and go backwards to Znaim, and should he succeed to prevent the French, then he should hold them up how much he could. Again Kutuzov with all his weight set off to Znaim.
Having passed with hungry, bloated soldiers, without roads, by the mountains, on a stormy night, forty five versts, having lost a third of his troops back, Bagration got out to Gollabrun on the Vienna to Znaim road several hours before the French approached Gollabrun from Vienna. Kutuzov needed to go still a whole day with his own wagons so to reach Znaim, and because of this, so to save the army, Bagration should with his four thousand hungry, tormented soldiers hold on for the continuation of a day all of the enemy army meeting with him at Gollabrun was, obviously, impossible. But strange fate made the impossible possible. The success of the deception, which without battle gave the Viennese bridge into the hands of the French, prompted Murat to try to deceive Kutuzov so the same. Murat, meeting the weak detachment of Bagration on the Znaim road, thought that this was the whole army of Kutuzov. So if to undoubtedly crush this army, he was waiting for straggling troops by the road from Vienna and with this purpose proposed a three day truce, with the condition that those and other troops not change their provisions and not move off from their places. Murat assured that there were already talks about peace and that in order to avoid useless spilling of blood, he offered truce. The Austrian General Count Nostits, standing at the outposts, believed the parliamentarian words of Murat and stepped back, opening the detachment of Bagration. A different parliamentarian went in the Russian chain to declare the same news about peace talks and to propose a truce with the Russian troops for three days. Bagration responded that he may not take or not take a truce, and with a report made about it sent the sentence to Kutuzov and his adjutant.
Truce for Kutuzov was the only way to win time, to give relaxation to the tormented detachment of Bagration and to let the wagons and weight pass (a move which was hidden from the French), in one excessive transition before Znaim. A proposal of truce gave the only unexpected opportunity to save the army. Receiving this news, Kutuzov immediately sent General-Adjutant Wintsengerode to the enemy camp. Wintsengerode was not only to accept the truce, but to propose conditions of capitulation, but between this Kutuzov sent his adjutants backwards to rush in how to possibly move the wagons throughout the army by the Krems to Znaim road. The tormented, hungry detachment of Bagration alone was, covering up by themselves this move of wagons throughout the army, still staying before the eight time stronger enemy.
The expectations of Kutuzov came true regarding that offers of capitulation, or why it was not binding, could give him time to take some parts of the wagons, and regarding that error Murat should open very soon. So only Bonaparte, found in Schonbrunn, at 25 versts from Gollabrunn, received the report of Murat and the project of truce and capitulation, saw the cheating and wrote the following letter to Murat:
Prince Murat. Schonbrunn, 25 Brumaire 1805. 8 in the morning.
I cannot find the words to express to you my displeasure. You command only my vanguard and do not have the right to make a truce without my orders. You force me to lose the fruits of the whole campaign. Immediately tear up the truce and go against the enemy. You announce to that general that signed this capitulation, he had no right, and no one does, excluding only the Russian emperor.
However, if the Russian emperor will agree on the mentioned condition, I also agree; but this is nothing other than cunning. Go, demolish the Russian army... You may take her wagons and her artillery.
The general-adjutant of the Russian emperor is lying... the officers mean nothing, when the authorities don’t have authority; he also does not have it... The Austrians gave themselves to deceit at the transition of the Viennese bridge, but you give yourself to the deceit of the adjutants of the emperor.
Napoleon.307
The adjutant of Bonaparte in all the agility of the horses galloped with this formidable letter to Murat. Bonaparte himself, not trusting his generals, with all his guard moved to advance the battle, fearing to miss the ready victim, but the 4000 soldier detachment of Bagration, funnily laying fires, dried, heated, and cooked for the first time after three days of porridge, and none of the people of the detachment knew or thought about what was happening to them.
307
Au prince Murat. Schoenbrunn, 25 brumaire en 1805 à huit heures du matin.
“Il m’est impossible de trouver des termes pour vous exprimer mon mécontentement. Vous ne commandez que mon avant-garde et vous n’avez pas le droit de faire d’armistice sans mon ordre. Vous me faites perdre le fruit d’une campagne. Rompez l’armistice sur-le-champ et marchez à l’ennemi. Vous lui ferez déclarer, que le général qui a signé cette capitulation, n’avait pas le droit de le faire, qu’il n’y a que l’Empereur de Russie qui ait ce droit.
“Toutes les fois cependant que l’Empereur de Russie ratifierait la ditè convention, je la ratifierai; mais ce n’est qu’une ruse. Marchez, detruisez l’armée russe... vous êtes en position de prendre son bagage et son artillerie.
“L’aide-de-camp de l’Empereur de Russie est un... Les officiers ne sont rien quand ils n’ont pas de pouvoirs: celui-ci n’en avait point... Les Autrichiens se sont laissé jouer pour le passage du pont, de Vienne, vous vous laissez jouer par un aide-decamp de l’Empereur.
Napoléon.”
(To Prince Murat. Schoenbrunn, 25 Brumaire in 1805 at eight o'clock in the morning.
“It’s impossible for me to find terms to express my discontent. You do not order my vanguard and you do not have the right to make an armistice without my order. You are making me lose the fruit of a campaign. Break up the armistice on the field and march at the enemy. You will declare to him, that the general who signed this capitulation, did not have the right to do it, that it is only the Emperor of Russia who has this right. All the times, however, that the Emperor of Russia would ratify the said convention, I will ratify it; but it is a ruse. March, destroy the Russian army...you are in a position to take its baggage and its artillery.
“The aide-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia is a... The officers are nothing when they have no powers: this one had none...The Austrians have let play for the passage of the bridge, from Vienna, you let yourself be played by an aide-de-camp of the Emperor.
Napoleon.")
Time: 1st of November (thirteenth of November in Dole.), 25 Brumaire, 1805, at eight o'clock in the morning
Location:
Mentioned: the bridge at Vienna, French, Russia (also Russian), Krems, Ulm, Bohemian Mountains, Olmutz, Znaim, Austrian, Hollabrunn, Schonbrunn (Schoenbrunn in Mandelker)
Pevear and Volkhonsky notes: Again repeat and reemphasis of the Russian position, hopeless, and like Mack’s at Ulm. Kutuzov’s impossible choice, in which he picks to be outnumbered three to one and surrounded by both sides. They have to pick the tougher road to follow to beat the French to Znaim. Losing men as stragglers always a reality of the march, always something Tolstoy takes into account.
Location:
Mentioned: the bridge at Vienna, French, Russia (also Russian), Krems, Ulm, Bohemian Mountains, Olmutz, Znaim, Austrian, Hollabrunn, Schonbrunn (Schoenbrunn in Mandelker)
Pevear and Volkhonsky notes: Again repeat and reemphasis of the Russian position, hopeless, and like Mack’s at Ulm. Kutuzov’s impossible choice, in which he picks to be outnumbered three to one and surrounded by both sides. They have to pick the tougher road to follow to beat the French to Znaim. Losing men as stragglers always a reality of the march, always something Tolstoy takes into account.
“A freak of fate made the impossible possible.” The armies get confused about who needs the truce more and this truce gives Kutuzov the time he needs to bring his supplies and armies. Kutuzov offers to capitulate without committing
to buy time. Murat is the one who makes the drastic mistake. Napoleon is actually right here though, sees the parallel of the mistake the Austrians made on the bridge in the early chapter and the mistake Murat makes here. Napoleon
has his own tricks. The Russian officers have no power outside the Tsar. Bonaparte does not trust his general.
to buy time. Murat is the one who makes the drastic mistake. Napoleon is actually right here though, sees the parallel of the mistake the Austrians made on the bridge in the early chapter and the mistake Murat makes here. Napoleon
has his own tricks. The Russian officers have no power outside the Tsar. Bonaparte does not trust his general.
“Not one man in the division knew or thought about what lay ahead of him” (after they get rest and food)
Characters (characters who do not appear, but are mentioned are placed in italics. First appearances are in Bold. First mentions are underlined. Final appearance denoted by *):
Kutuzof
Scout (the one that brings Kutuzof the news that his army is in a helpless position. “Spy” in Wiener, Dunnigan, and Maude. Bell uses “spy” and “reporter” instead of using the same word both mentions.)
Napoleon Bonaparte (also “Buonaparte” in Maude)
Mack
Bagration
Murat
Count Nostitz
Emissary (of Murat.)
Another Emissary (the one that goes to the Russian line instead of the Austrian.)
Adjutant (Bagration’s)
Winzengerode (“Vintzengerode” in the novel’s opening. Described here as “adjutant-general” as in Dole, Wiener, and Mandelker (the latter two capitalize both words). “general-adjutant” in Garnett.)
Czar Alexander (“Emperor of Russia” or “The Russian emperor”)
Bonaparte’s aid (as in Dole. “The aide-de-camp who acted as courier” in Bell. “Adjutant” in Maude, Edmonds, and Dunnigan.)
(because the chapter is expository and summative, it is difficult to make a judgment as to whether all the characters should be listed as mentioned in the chapter or as characters in the chapter. Mainly because this would be the
first chapter that Napoleon Bonaparte would actually be in, I am choosing to consider them as just mentioned.)
first chapter that Napoleon Bonaparte would actually be in, I am choosing to consider them as just mentioned.)
(of course, many soldiers, armies, etc)
Abridged Versions: No chapter break in Bell.
Gibian: End of Chapter 10
Gibian: End of Chapter 10
Fuller: Mention of Mack is removed but the rest of the chapter is preserved. Next section starts on the next page and is difficult to tell whether or not there is a line break.
Komroff: Entire chapter is cut
Kropotkin: Chapter 7: Everything from the initial sentence (ending with “inextricable position”) to the second part of the report “The French, according to the report of the scout, had crossed the bridge at Vienna” is removed.
The mention of the French having the better road is also removed. The second emissary is removed (one wonders why the emissary to the Austrians wasn’t removed). Rest of chapter is preserved.
The mention of the French having the better road is also removed. The second emissary is removed (one wonders why the emissary to the Austrians wasn’t removed). Rest of chapter is preserved.
Bromfield: Chapter 15: Chapter appears the same.
Simmons: Entire chapter is cut and replaced with: "Bagration is sent with a small advance guard to delay the enemy at Hollabrunn and cover the retreat of Kutuzov's main force from Krems to Znaim. When Murat
confronts Bagration at Hollabrunn with his advanced detachment, he thinks it is the whole Russian army and tries to trick it by a truce until his main force arrives. Napoleon at Schonbrunn guesses the real situation
and dispatches an adjutant to Murat with orders to attack." End of Chapter 10.
Simmons: Entire chapter is cut and replaced with: "Bagration is sent with a small advance guard to delay the enemy at Hollabrunn and cover the retreat of Kutuzov's main force from Krems to Znaim. When Murat
confronts Bagration at Hollabrunn with his advanced detachment, he thinks it is the whole Russian army and tries to trick it by a truce until his main force arrives. Napoleon at Schonbrunn guesses the real situation
and dispatches an adjutant to Murat with orders to attack." End of Chapter 10.
Additional Notes: Maude:
“From Krems to Znaim: the road from Vienna to Znaim by which Murat was advancing ran parallel, and to the east, of the road from Krems by which Kutuzov was retiring. These roads approached each other at an angle.
From the Krems road one could cross to the Vienna road at two places: either at Hollabrunn (where Bagration was sent) or by further on by a more convenient road which came out at the village of Grunth. When Bagration
succeeded in reaching Hollabrunn before Murat, Kutuzov crossed to Grunth to join him, letting his baggage go straight on to Znaim. The battle which took place at Schon Grabern is described in the following chapters.”
From the Krems road one could cross to the Vienna road at two places: either at Hollabrunn (where Bagration was sent) or by further on by a more convenient road which came out at the village of Grunth. When Bagration
succeeded in reaching Hollabrunn before Murat, Kutuzov crossed to Grunth to join him, letting his baggage go straight on to Znaim. The battle which took place at Schon Grabern is described in the following chapters.”
Garnett: Napoleon’s letter: Adolphe Thiers’s History of the Consulate and the Empire of France.
Hadji Murat: Page 45: “And in general, the entire dinner passed with stories about Hadji Murat. They all vied with one another in praising his courage, intelligence, magnanimity. Somebody told of how he had ordered twenty-six prisoners to be killed, but even this met with the usual response:
Hadji Murat: Page 45: “And in general, the entire dinner passed with stories about Hadji Murat. They all vied with one another in praising his courage, intelligence, magnanimity. Somebody told of how he had ordered twenty-six prisoners to be killed, but even this met with the usual response:
‘What can one do! A la guerre comme a la guerre.’
‘He’s a major figure.’
‘If he’d been born in Europe, perhaps he’d have been a new Napoleon,’ said the stupid Georgian prince who had the gift of flattery.
He knew that any mention of Napoleon, for victory over whom Vorontsov wore the white cross around his neck, was pleasing to the Prince.
‘Well, maybe not Napoleon, but a dashing cavalry general - yes,’ said Vorontsov.
‘If not Napoleon, then Murat.’
‘And his name is Hadji Murat.’”
Roberts: Page 631: “Napoleon told Eugene...He (Murat) is a brave man on the field of battle, but he is totally devoid of intelligence and moral courage.”
Fremont-Barnes: Page 70: Bagration, the commander of the rear guard, tricked Murat into believing an armistice had been arranged....thus failing to prevent the Russian joining his compatriots."
No comments:
Post a Comment